



Assessing and Responding to Short-Term Rentals in Oregon

ENABLING THE BENEFITS OF THE SHARING ECONOMY

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Table of Contents

Abstract	4
Acknowledgments.....	5
Questions of More Information?.....	5
Executive Summary	6
Introduction	6
Key Findings	6
Conclusion	8
Recommendations.....	8
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	11
Purpose.....	12
Methodology.....	12
Limitations.....	13
Chapter 2: Key Findings	15
What is the prevalence and characteristics of short-term rentals in Oregon?	15
What is the revenue potential of short-term rentals in Oregon?	18
To what extent do short-term rentals constrain the supply of housing?	22
What are the existing perceptions around short-term rentals in Oregon?	24
How are short-term rentals currently being regulated in Oregon?	26
Chapter 3: Conclusions	28
How should policy makers and planners in Oregon respond to short-term rentals?	28
How should planners and policy makers enforce short-term rentals?	35
The Need for Continuous Evaluation	36
Future Research.....	36
Chapter 4: Policy Recommendations.....	38
Regulatory Recommendations	38
Legislative Approaches: A Typology for Smaller Jurisdictions	40
Appendix A: Literature Review	44
Impact of Short-Term Rentals.....	44
Short-Term Rental Policy	46
Summary.....	47
Concept Map.....	48
Appendix B: Case Studies	49
Summary Facts.....	50

Legislative Approaches.....	54
Appendix C: Industry Summary for Cities with Airbnbs.....	57
Appendix D: Sensitivity Test, AirDnA vs Airbnb Data.....	62
Bibliography	64

Abstract

Assessing and Responding to Short-Term Rentals in Oregon: Enabling the Benefits of the Sharing Economy

Local, regional, and state governments across the country struggle to manage the impacts of short-term rentals (STRs), and the sharing economy more generally. Often referred to as vacation rentals, STRs are not new to the housing market yet, in the last decade, technology has greatly influenced their prevalence. Private, web-based businesses such as Airbnb, VRBO, HomeToGo, LUXbnb, CouchSurfing, HomeAway, FlipKey, and VaCasa, have given people access to a user-friendly, global marketplace for home sharing.

As the sharing economy proliferates, STRs have often flown under the radar of government taxation and regulation. Accordingly, many perceived negative impacts of STRs exist including the loss of tax revenue and impacts on traditional lodging businesses, neighborhoods, housing affordability, and housing availability. Still, the widespread use of these platforms show evidence of many localized benefits. Some of these benefits include allowing property owners to earn income by renting out their unused space, offering tourists an experience that is more unique, and among others, driving visitors to places not conventionally accessible for tourists (spurring economic activity in new areas and communities).

Because this economic activity, as it used today, is a relatively new phenomenon, existing research is sparse and tends to focus on large/mega cities. Thus, this research fills an important gap by focusing on small, tourism-oriented towns in Oregon. We address the following research questions in this paper: 1) What is the prevalence and characteristics of short-term rentals in Oregon? 2) What is the revenue potential of short-term rentals in Oregon? 3) What are the existing perceptions around short-term rentals in Oregon? 4) How are short-term rentals currently being regulated in Oregon? 5) To what extent do short-term rentals compete with long-term rentals?

To examine the prevalence of short-term rentals, we rely on city-level data from AirBnB and property-specific data from AirDnA, for cities under 100,000 in population. We also use American Community Survey data to examine the share of total housing units and vacant units with short-term rentals. To understand the positive and negative impacts and the regulatory environment, we rely on a survey administered to city managers and city planners.

This work provides timely and valuable information to small and mid-sized cities regarding a recent trend affecting housing. Planners and city staff need to understand how short-term rentals are affecting their communities and respond with appropriate regulatory controls.

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Thank you to the many individuals who provided input with survey responses and thank you to AirBnB who has supported this research by providing valuable data.

Questions of More Information?

Oregon communities interested in short-term rental data for their community, county, or region (or who have questions about this report) can contact Sadie DiNatale at Sadie.dinatale@gmail.com.

Executive Summary

This summary briefly outlines the purpose of this project, delineates key findings, and concludes with ways to respond to the impacts of short-term rentals (STRs) in smaller cities.

Introduction

Short-term rentals (STRs) are often defined as housing units that are rented or leased for less than 30 days, although they are not officially defined by state or federal authorities. Part of the sharing economy, STRs are representative of a phenomenon in which people are increasingly choosing to share access to goods and services via a lateral or hierarchical exchange (which often includes a monetary exchange as well). This trend has been understood to offer both benefits and costs to communities across the country.

Accordingly, this project uses Airbnb property data for the state of Oregon to understand how this sharing economy activity influences cities with populations fewer than 100,000. Case studies are used to delve deeper into this analysis. A survey sent to Oregon city managers and planning directors complements this research by gauging the existing policy frameworks for STRs in Oregon. This survey provides insight into how cities view STRs and assists in the development of regulatory best practices for responding to STR impacts.

Key Findings

What is the prevalence and characteristics of short-term rentals in Oregon cities with <100,000 people?

- Airbnbs account for more than 5% of total housing in only 16 cities, indicating that short-term rentals are not prevalent in most jurisdictions. Still, we must qualify this statement with the fact that not all short-term rentals are equivalent to one dwelling unit.
- Airbnbs are most prevalent in Central Oregon and the North Coast.
- From 2014 to 2016, the number of new STRs created increased by roughly 180%.
- Short-term rentals tend to be in lower income neighborhoods more commonly.
- Most Airbnb hosts operate a single STR. Of approximately 4,400 hosts, 22% operate more than one STR.
- Approximately 70% of Airbnb hosts rent out their entire home/apartment (either primary or second home) and another 30% of STRs are listed or rented out as a private room (the remaining 1% is listed as a shared room).
- Most STRs are traditional property types. Approximately 60% of all listed properties are houses and another 13% are apartments.

What is the revenue potential of short-term rentals in Oregon cities with <100,000 people?

- Short-term rentals generate substantial revenue in Oregon. Hosts have earned an aggregated \$82 million in the last year.
- Nine of the 15 cities with the highest grossing revenue are in the North Coast.
- Eight of the 15 cities with the highest revenue per capita are also located in the North Coast.

- Approximately 70% of Airbnb hosts generate less than \$10,000/year in gross revenue for operating their short-term rental(s).
- Transient lodging taxes (TLT) imposed on Airbnbs by the state generate substantial fiscal revenue. The state, imposing a 1.8% TLT on an estimated \$82 million, earned approximately \$1.5 million from Airbnb STRs in the last year.

To what extent do short-term rentals constrain the supply of housing in Oregon cities with <100,000 people?

- Half of all STRs are reserved for less than 30 days (36% are reserved for 10 or fewer days).
- In more urbanized regions such as Portland Metro and Willamette Valley, STRs are operated as private rooms slightly more than as entire homes.
- Perhaps a more accurate determination of housing supply constraints is the ratio of STRs (entire homes, rented for more than 30 days per year) to total housing units. Using this ratio to measure supply constraints, STRs account for approximately 2% of total housing in the North Coast and approximately 1.8% in Central Oregon.
- For most case study cities, data suggests that STRs are constraining the supply of long-term housing.
 - In case study cities, new STR growth is increasing at a faster rate than newly constructed total housing units.
 - Property owners in resort communities (case studies) can generate more annual revenue off STRs than they can off standard long-term rental units.

What are the existing perceptions around short-term rentals in Oregon?

- In general, survey respondents indicated that while residents shared mixed perceptions about STRs, local elected officials and businesses within the accommodation sector viewed STRs as less problematic.
- STRs provide great benefits including their ability to provide transient lodging tax revenue, to support tourism activities, and to support communities that rely on tourism.
- STRs economically weaken communities by impacting resources such as the availability of housing (especially affordable and rental housing) and police and city staff time who deal with complaints from neighbors/business owners.
- Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with that statement that STRs evaded policies and regulations in their communities (26%), surprisingly did not all agree that their policies were ineffective.
- Communities who do not see the need to regulate STRs indicated that STRs are either not a problem in their community (e.g. there are no STRs or not enough STRs to regulate) or that STRs fit in with the character of their community and therefore regulation was not necessary.
- Most communities who will potentially develop ordinances to regulate STRs in the next five years will do so primarily to formalize the process and rules associated with it, legitimize existing situations, develop clear and objective standards, and promote fairness.

How are short-term rentals currently being regulated in Oregon?

- STRs are commonly referred to as short-term rentals, transient rentals, or vacation rentals.
- STRs are most commonly defined as units rented for less than 30 days.

- Most regulations for STR require that operators have a license and/or permit (92%) and 81% of respondents also indicated that their community imposes a transient lodging tax (or similar tax) on STRs.
- Respondents also commonly regulate STRs by relying on concentration caps or occupancy requirements.
- Most respondents (60%) find their regulations for STRs, or lack thereof, to be neither effective nor ineffective in managing the economic benefits or negative impacts of short-term rentals.
- STR ordinances were most commonly enforced by issuances of administrative citations (62%) and fines (58%).

Conclusion

We know that the solution to STRs will be different for every city. What is true for Oregon is true for communities across the United States: STRs affect cities dissimilarly and in turn, view STRs diversely. Accordingly, many communities have taken the experimental and incremental approach, not knowing if their policy will truly mitigate the impacts and/or enable the benefits hoped for but needing to trial something.

In the response to short-term rentals, communities should **construct regulations in conjunction with both a local, community conversation and a regional conversation.** This inclusivity aspect is key to construct equitable regulations less likely to be evaded and more likely to mitigate the negative externalities created by STRs and these policies themselves.

Additional best practices are as follows. More information on these practices can be found in Chapter 3.

- Define Short-Term Rentals and Codify Regulations in City Ordinances
- Distinguish Between Short-Term Rentals
- Restrict Use or Incentivize Moderate Use (rather than banning STRs)
- Normalize STRs as a Residential Activity (with Caveats)
- Permit STRs in Premium Areas with Monitoring
- Develop Appropriate Regulatory Standards
- Require STRs to Get a Permit or License
- Require STR Operators to Pay Fees and Taxes

Regarding enforcement, it is difficult for governments to regulate something they do not have complete control over. Initiating community conversations to educate and encourage appropriate use of STRs can, however, induce a culture of self-regulation and compliance.

Recommendations

The following sections break recommendations into minimum requirements and ancillary requirements for cities. Next, I provide recommendations for counties/regions and the State.

Minimum Regulatory Recommendations for All Cities

Whether a city has STRs or not, communities should establish the following regulations, even as a precautionary measure:

1. Legally define STRs as “short-term rentals” and establish a fair frequency of use standard that is complimentary of regional standards.
2. Codify regulations in local ordinance. Impose a guest capacity limit and require inspections.
3. Levy a transient lodging tax (if not imposed at the county level).
4. Require that STR operators register their unit(s) on an annual basis.

Ancillary Regulatory Recommendation with Thresholds for Cities

Variations in number and concentration of STRs should influence policy choices. The following recommendations provide thresholds for ancillary regulations as a starting point. In that, thresholds may vary between communities.

1. Restrict (cap/limit) STRs or incentivize moderate use if STRs account for more than 4% of total housing stock.
2. Impose a clause that revokes a STR permit for properties that receive more than five nuisance complaints in a calendar year.
3. Limit STRs in proximity to other STRs (deconcentrate) when city-wide/area-specific nuisance complaints exceed 25 complaints in a calendar year. Communities should establish a fair distance (e.g. 50 to 200 feet buffer between STRs), weigh equity implications, and re-evaluate buffer distance every two to five years.
 - a. Before establishing a buffer distance, cities should increase regulatory standards and evaluate whether nuisance complaints reduce (e.g. establishing minimum parking standards may mitigate parking complaints).

Recommendations for Counties and Regions

Smaller jurisdictions may have difficulties managing STRs. That said, counties/regions should help facilitate proper management of STRs.

1. Levy a transient lodging tax at the county level if barriers exist for cities to impose their own (due to population size, low prevalence of STRs in individual communities, administrative limitations, etc.).
2. Establish a regional representative or liaison to attend Sharing Economy Committee meetings (see first “Recommendation for Oregon”). Regional liaisons should represent multiple counties.

Recommendations for Oregon

Oregon can and should become a leader in the management of STRs. This will require the state to become a leader in sharing economy affairs.

1. Establish a Sharing Economy Committee to facilitate research (including analysis of STR trends) and to assist communities across the state dealing with various issues. The objective of this committee should be one in support of sharing economy activities.

2. Hire a state employee to work directly in sharing economy affairs. Responsibilities should include:
 - Analyze sharing economy trends across the state, country, and globe
 - Communicate initiatives, information, and best practices to governments across the state
 - Provide government assistance in STR management
 - Collaborate with sharing-economy platforms
 - Collect data
 - Participate in global sharing economy networks
 - Coordinate state Sharing Economy Committee meetings, trainings, and workshops
 - Launch policy demonstration studies to pilot regulatory frameworks and options
3. Maintain a neutral Transient Lodging Tax at 1.8% to allow regions and cities to use their tax rates to manage STR growth.
4. Establish a pool of funding to help small communities amend land use ordinances for STRs.

Chapter 1: Introduction

While not officially defined by state or federal authorities, a short-term rental (STR) can be generally characterized as a housing unit that is leased or rented for less than 30 days. It is an arrangement that involves the trade of the temporary, but not future use, of a full or partial housing unit (Flath 1980). Sometimes referred to as vacation rentals, they are not new commodities of the housing market.

In recent years however, technology has greatly influenced the STR and vacation rental market (Varma 2016, Fleetwood 2012). Internet-based businesses such as Airbnb, VRBO, HomeToGo, LUXbnb, CouchSurfing, HomeAway, FlipKey, and VaCasa have given people access to a user-friendly, global marketplace (i.e. Airbnb alone reaches 191 countries). These companies cater to the exchange of short-term rentals under the coordination of a web-interface. Today, with STRs remaining relatively unregulated, just about anyone can rent out a room, their home, or their apartment by following a simple, streamlined process.

Tech-based platforms (i.e. Airbnb; VRBO) that provide a market to short-term rentals are taking advantage of the sharing economy phenomenon. The prevalence of access based services (that employ pay-per-use models rather than ownership of certain goods) has increased in recent years. Technological advances coupled with individuals placing higher value on experiences (rather than possessions) have also aided in this market shift. This phenomenon has allowed businesses and individuals under this access/sharing economy umbrella to cash in on the new opportunities this phenomenon brings. For instance, Airbnb claims approximately 100 million users with 500,000 bookings/night (Smith, 2017) and is expected to earn upwards of \$3.5 million/year by 2020 (Gallagher, 2017). With that said, in a survey of Airbnb users, respondents were “nine times more likely to be more satisfied with Airbnb than their hotel stay” (Dillow, 2016).

With the introduction of new, sharing economy, business models came debate about how existing regulations address these new activities. Debate has considered whether the companies that market short-term rentals have also been able to reap greater financial returns by taking advantage of regulatory loop holes (allowing property owners to market their STRs through their site despite not being registered with the appropriate jurisdiction or despite these properties not having permits or paying tax, if applicable).

TERMS

Short-Term Rental (STR): A housing unit, rented or leased for less than 30 days; not officially defined by state or federal authorities

Sharing Economy:
An economic and social activity that mutualizes access to goods/services; tech-based and grown out of the open-source community; involves a peer-to-peer exchange (lateral exchange)

“a sharing economy is a blueprint of a future business idea that explains how to link economic, environmental and social issues”
(Daunorienè et al. 2015)

Access Economy: Suggested term for sharing economy activities which are market-mediated by a tech-based, intermediary company between suppliers and consumers (hierarchical exchange)

Impact:
The measurable effect a specific activity has on a defined area or people

The widespread use of these web-based platforms show evidence of many localized benefits, advertised to include: increasing tourism in local communities, helping property owners earn income by renting out their unused space, offering tourists and visitors the experience of living like a local,

“On the one hand, there are those who see the sharing economy as a tool for addressing pressing social justice or environmental issues — such as people establishing time banks, food sharing schemes or those pursuing alternative, low carbon lifestyles. At the other end of the spectrum, there are many entrepreneurs who stand to make millions of dollars from their new sharing platforms, mainly by encouraging people to rent out the underutilized goods they own”. (Makwana, 2013)

and driving visitors to areas tourists did not traditionally flock to.

Still, these companies often face criticism for negative impacts (such as nuisance issues or constraining the availability of housing) or for allowing its users to evade local policy. Because of these real and perceived negative impacts, cities have sought to regulate short-term rentals to

recoup lodging taxes, prevent impacts on housing affordability, and address neighborhood concerns around noise, traffic, and parking. Accordingly, short-term rentals have gained a reputation of both satisfying a cultural, social, and economic need while not being completely without social and economic consequence.

Purpose

The purpose of the research project is to assess how short-term rentals, as part of the sharing economy, directly impact small and mid-sized cities in Oregon via revenue generation and fiscal revenue potential. This study also looks at ways in which demand for STRs influence the supply of long-term housing. Better understanding these impacts will fill a gap in existing literature, as most studies have focused on how short-term rentals impact large cities or mega-cities. Moreover, the purpose of this project is to gauge existing perceptions and policy frameworks of STRs in Oregon cities as to better understand the political and social climate around this activity. This policy analysis is intended to assist planners and policy makers of small communities respond to and better manage STRs in order to enable the benefits of the sharing economy.

Methodology

This study uses a mixed-method-approach. Data analysis used secondary sources including:


- **AirDnA:** market summary and property performance reports
- **AirBnB:** aggregated industry data by city
- **American Community Survey:** Housing and Population characteristics

Data analysis is used to answer the questions: What is the prevalence and characteristics of short-term rentals in Oregon? What is the revenue potential of short-term rentals in Oregon? And, to what extent do STRs constrain the supply of housing? This analysis specifically looks at cities with a

population of less than 100,000 (communities that have been mostly excluded from existing studies on this topic).

In addition, we created an innovative survey, developed on Qualtrics, to get information about policies and perceptions of city administrators and planners across Oregon. The survey had 32 questions and asked City managers and planners to comment on the ways in which STRs impact their community. Questions also asked City staff to comment on the ways in which various actors perceive STRs in their community. Finally, the survey asked City staff to comment on their existing or potential policy framework for STRs. The survey received 103 responses out of a possible 294 yielding a response rate of 35%.

Map 1.1. Location of Survey Respondents



Source: Responding to Short Term Rentals in Oregon Survey, Q27, 2017.

Further, using a series of selected case studies, I dig deeper into the connection between regulatory frameworks, perceptions of STRs, and the actual impact they create in small to mid-sized cities. Criteria for selection was that the city possess elevated levels of Airbnb rentals as compared to other Oregon cities and/or possess a high percentage of Airbnb rentals as compared to the community's total housing units. Additionally, I ensure that case studies represented a range of city sizes (with populations of under 100,000) and that selected cities came from a range of geographic regions in Oregon. Predominantly, these cities are tourist destinations. A description of the case studies and applicable data is in Appendix B. Case studies are: Ashland, Bend, Depoe Bay, Hood River, Joseph, Lincoln City, Manzanita, Rockaway Beach, Seaside, and Sisters.

Limitations

As in most analyses, several limitations exist. To enable transparency, this study presents the following limitations:

- AirDnA data was heavily relied on for this analysis. While the data set was very useful in explaining both the nature of short-term rentals and their impact in Oregon, margins of error are unknown and thus, its accuracy is questionable. I did compare AirDnA data (presented at the property level) with Airbnb data (limited to the city level) as a sensitivity test in Appendix D and found similarities. AirDnA data was also slightly manipulated by the researcher to remove fake and test listings.
- All STRs are not advertised or listed through the Airbnb platform. For instance, some property owners may use VRBO, HomeAway, and other platforms to market their STRs. Thus, communities may have more STRs than what was documented in this study.
- A limitation to the ‘Responding to Short-Term Rentals in Oregon’ survey is that not all cities in Oregon participated, meaning these results are not entirely comprehensive. Some communities indicated that they did not take the survey because they do not have any STRs (real and perceived) which may have limited learning about the perspectives of communities who are not currently concerned about this component of contemporary housing discussions.
- A final limitation was time. The researcher was unable to conduct interviews with city administrators or staff planners in each of the case studies cities (or with regional/state housing experts). This restricted the ability to fully compare findings with perceptions and to discuss potential future actions. As a result, full reliance was placed on the applicable city’s survey responses (apart from Depoe Bay which was not received) and code review.

Chapter 2: Key Findings

The organization of this chapter¹ is as follows:

- 1) What is the prevalence and characteristics of STRs in Oregon?
- 2) What is the revenue potential of STRs in Oregon?
- 3) What are the existing perceptions around STRs in Oregon?
- 4) How are STRs currently being regulated in Oregon?
- 5) To what extent do STRs constrain the supply of housing in Oregon?

Overarchingly, this chapter conveys findings only for cities in Oregon with populations less than 100,000 (unless otherwise specified). ***In that, Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham were excluded from analysis as to focus in on how STRs affect smaller cities in Oregon. Also, excluded from analysis are STRs in census-designated places or towns (as of 2015).***

What is the prevalence and characteristics of short-term rentals in Oregon?


Oregon's four largest cities (Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham) encompass approximately 10,000 AirBnBs (56% of the state's AirBnB short-term rental stock). Cities with less than 100,000 people (from this point further: cities) encompass approximately 8,000 Airbnb STRs; roughly 44% of total Airbnbs for the state. As a note, Airbnb are located within every county and in 75% of the state's total cities.

Assessing the approximate number of STRs (as well as their location and property characteristics) enables conceptualization of the industry. Use of existing studies provides additional context for findings.

- **Airbnbs account for more than 5% of total housing in only 16 cities, indicating that short-term rentals are not prevalent in most jurisdictions (see Map 2.1).** Still, we must qualify this statement with the fact that not all short-term rentals are equivalent to one dwelling unit. Nevertheless, for these 15 jurisdictions (Bend, Depoe Bay, Gaston, Hood River, Joseph, Lincoln City, Long Creek, Manzanita, Mitchell, Mosier, Nehalem, Rockaway Beach, Seaside, Sisters, Westfir, and Yachats), the ratio of AirBnBs to housing units could suggest a potential housing supply constraint. This concern will be further addressed later in this report.

¹ This chapter uses AirDnA data as well as information from the American Community Survey to paint a picture of the nature of STRs in Oregon as well as their impact. The Responding to Short-Term Rentals in Oregon Survey was also used to understand existing policy frameworks and perceptions of STRs.

Map 2.1. Indication of Potential Housing Supply Constraint for Cities with Higher Portion of STRs




Source: AirDnA Property Data, Retrieved 2017. United States Census, American Community Survey, Population Data, 2011-2015. Excludes Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham.

- **Airbnbs are most prevalent in Central Oregon and the North Coast.** In Central Oregon, AirBnBs account for approximately 4% of the region's total housing stock. In the North Coast, Airbnbs account for 5% of the region's total housing stock. Again, this is not a precise equivalency; rather it is an opportunity for conceptualization. For cities in the remaining six regions, Airbnbs account for approximately 1% of the total housing stock. As “the top five activities engaged in by travelers on overnight trips to Oregon were shopping, visiting a beach/waterfront, visiting a national/state park, visiting a landmark/historic site, and hiking/backing,” it is understandable why these two regions attract so many tourists and visitors and further explains why there is such a demand for STRs.²
- **From 2014 to 2016, the number of new STRs created increased by roughly 180%.** In this same time, but by region, the number of new STRs created increased most drastically for Southeast Oregon (282%), Portland Metro (230%), and Central Oregon (211%), see Figure 2.2.

² Longwoods, International, USA. (2015). Oregon 2015 Visitor Report.
<http://industry.traveloregon.com/content/uploads/2016/11/Oregon-2015-Visitor-Final-Report.pdf>

Figure 2.2. Growth of Newly Created Short-Term Rentals by Region, 2014 to 2016



Source: AirDnA Property Data, Retrieved 2017. Excludes Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham.

- **Short-term rentals tend to be in lower income neighborhoods more commonly.** To measure, neighborhood is defined as the properties' census tract and lower income as median household income of census tract divided by the county's median household income. In areas like the South Coast, North Coast, and Central Oregon, I find more than half of the regions' properties are geographically located in lower income neighborhoods, see Table 2.9.

Table 2.9. Properties in Tracts with Higher/Lower Median Household Incomes than County, 2015

Region	Less Than County	Equal to/More Than County	Total
South Coast Oregon	66%	34%	309
Central Oregon	65%	35%	2,887
North Coast Oregon	64%	36%	1,720
Southern Oregon	42%	58%	769
Willamette Valley	40%	60%	961
Northeast Oregon	37%	63%	177
Portland Metro	35%	65%	1,052
Southeast Oregon	27%	73%	142
Total	54%	46%	8,017

Source: AirDnA Property Data, Retrieved 2017. ACS 2011-2015, Median Household Income. Excludes Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham.

- **Most Airbnb hosts operate a single STR listed as the entire home.** Approximately, 4,400 hosts operate an Airbnb in small to mid-sized Oregon cities. Of these, 970 hosts (22%), operate more than one STR. Approximately 70% of Airbnb hosts rent out their entire home/apartment (either primary or vacation home) and another 30% are listed or rented out as a private room (the remaining 1% is listed as a shared room). This data reveals a bit about STR hosts. For instance, while most hosts are renting out their entire housing unit, a substantial portion of hosts (approximately 1/3) appear to be interested in making supplementary income solely off some of their extra space. This is an important distinction about the use of short-term rentals. To explain, as of 2015, the average household size for

owner/renter-occupied housing units was approximately 2.5 people while almost 60% of housing units had 3 or more bedrooms.³ Accordingly, despite actual motives, many short-term rental operators are capitalizing on the efficient use of space, driving sustainable practices.

- **Most STRs are traditional property types.** Approximately 60% of all listed properties are houses and another 13% are apartments. Other common STR property types also remain more traditional, to include: condominiums, bed and breakfasts, cabins, and townhouses (see Table 2.3). Larger cities tend to encompass a larger percentage of apartment buildings, indicative of more urbanized areas.

Table 2.3. Airbnb Property Types (using all cities for added context)

Property Types	Cities with Pop. < 100,000		All Cities		Property Types	Cities with Pop. < 100,000		All Cities	
House	4,877	60.0%	10,927	59.4%	Timeshare	10	0.1%	10	0.1%
Apartment	1,068	13.1%	4,000	21.7%	Hostel	8	0.1%	12	0.1%
Other	470	5.8%	639	3.5%	Castle	6	0.1%	13	0.1%
Condominium	426	5.2%	638	3.5%	Boat	5	0.1%	27	0.1%
Bed & Breakfast	316	3.9%	465	2.5%	Dorm	5	0.1%	16	0.1%
Cabin	244	3.0%	322	1.8%	Nature Lodge	5	0.1%	5	0.0%
Townhouse	181	2.2%	321	1.7%	Treehouse	5	0.1%	8	0.0%
Camper/RV	116	1.4%	201	1.1%	Train	3	0.0%	3	0.0%
Guesthouse	76	0.9%	195	1.1%	Hut	1	0.0%	6	0.0%
Villa	69	0.8%	104	0.6%	Island	1	0.0%	1	0.0%
Bungalow	61	0.8%	124	0.7%	Lighthouse	1	0.0%	1	0.0%
Loft	57	0.7%	162	0.9%	Entire Floor	-	-	7	0.0%
Boutique Hotel	38	0.5%	43	0.2%	Earth House	-	-	5	0.0%
Tent	37	0.5%	73	0.4%	Igloo	-	-	2	0.0%
Chalet	20	0.2%	24	0.1%	Cave	-	-	1	0.0%
Yurt	14	0.2%	23	0.1%	Van	-	-	1	0.0%
Tipi	12	0.1%	13	0.1%	Total	8,132	100%	18,392	100%

Source: AirDnA property data, 2017. Excludes Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham.

What is the revenue potential of short-term rentals in Oregon?

Analysis of the financial details of STRs allows one to understand the profitability of these units (for hosts and municipalities) as well as the potential economic development opportunity they can bring.

- **Short-term rentals generate substantial revenue in Oregon.** Hosts have earned an aggregated \$82 million in the last year. This indicates potential positive gains to local economies assuming hosts reinvest locally. After discounting larger cities, Central Oregon and the North Coast far out earn other regions. These two regions also charge a higher daily rate/Airbnb on average and receive more annual bookings (Table 2.4).

³ United States Census. American Community Survey, 2011-2015, Selected Housing Characteristics for Oregon (DP04).

Table 2.4. Annual Revenue Earned by Hosts and State Tax Revenue Earned (estimate)

Regions	Average Daily Rate per Property	Total Bookings Annual	Annual Revenue	State Levy (1.8%) Annual Earnings
Central Oregon	\$ 209	46,391	\$ 37,539,776	\$ 675,716
North Coast	\$ 206	38,927	\$ 24,875,499	\$ 447,759
Willamette Valley	\$ 97	14,026	\$ 5,315,475	\$ 95,679
Portland Metro	\$ 72	11,172	\$ 4,937,697	\$ 88,879
Southern Oregon	\$ 98	13,209	\$ 4,886,800	\$ 87,962
South Coast	\$ 132	5,710	\$ 2,335,541	\$ 42,040
Northeast Oregon	\$ 129	3,307	\$ 1,738,663	\$ 31,296
Southeast Oregon	\$ 125	2,977	\$ 1,143,628	\$ 20,585
Total	\$ 134	135,719	\$ 82,773,079	\$ 1,489,915

Source: AirDnA. Airbnb property level data. Retrieved 2017. Excludes Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham.

- **Nine of the 15 cities with the highest grossing revenue are in the North Coast.** Still, Table 2.5 shows that Bend receives a far more substantial amount of revenue (accounting for approximately 86% of all revenue from Central Oregon). Additionally, of these highest grossing cities, nine have Airbnbs that account for at least 5% of its housing stock (Bend, Depoe Bay, Hood River, Joseph, Lincoln City, Manzanita, Rockaway Beach, Seaside, and Yachats).


Table 2.5. Annual Revenue Generated with Frequency Data for Highest Grossing Cities

Cities	Region	Annual Revenue	Annual Revenue per Property (Max)	Annual Revenue per Property (Mean)	Annual Revenue Per Property (Std Dev)
Bend	Central Oregon	\$32,207,439	\$157,773	\$14,801	\$18,642
Seaside	North Coast	\$7,198,080	\$198,425	\$16,285	\$27,235
Lincoln City	North Coast	\$4,145,729	\$117,250	\$12,265	\$14,601
Cannon Beach	North Coast	\$2,876,320	\$203,617	\$35,077	\$39,131
Hood River	Central Oregon	\$2,426,970	\$81,215	\$7,537	\$10,428
Ashland	Southern Oregon	\$2,160,243	\$59,876	\$8,309	\$10,923
Rockaway Beach	North Coast	\$1,688,036	\$98,481	\$15,925	\$16,170
Depoe Bay	North Coast	\$1,650,062	\$59,288	\$13,866	\$16,207
Beaverton	Portland Metro	\$1,620,761	\$64,717	\$4,739	\$7,833
Manzanita	North Coast	\$1,368,957	\$90,051	\$16,105	\$16,773
Newport	North Coast	\$1,322,513	\$63,141	\$9,380	\$11,142
Redmond	Central Oregon	\$1,036,179	\$42,518	\$6,642	\$8,796
Tillamook	North Coast	\$1,014,970	\$69,780	\$11,941	\$13,862
Yachats	North Coast	\$1,000,579	\$62,675	\$14,714	\$11,232
Joseph	Northeast Oregon	\$996,192	\$64,836	\$17,176	\$13,523

Source: AirDnA Property Data, 2017. Excludes Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham.

- **Eight of the 15 cities with the highest revenue per capita are also located in the North Coast (see Figure 2.6).** Revenue per capita for the state, excluding cities over 100,000 and using ACS population data for 2015, is approximately \$54 dollars per person in the last year.


Figure 2.6. Cities with highest revenue generated per capita, 2015 population



Source: AirDnA Property Data, 2017. U.S. American Community Survey, 2011-2015 Population. Excludes Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham.

Displayed in another way, Figure 2.7 shows STR revenue per capita by county with an Airbnb property dot density layer.

Figure 2.7. Counties with STR Revenue per Capita




Source: AirDnA Property Data, 2017. Excludes Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham.

- **Approximately 70% of Airbnb hosts generate less than \$10,000/year in gross revenue for operating their short-term rental(s), see Figure 2.8.** Of those hosts, 30% generate less than \$600/year. As independent contractors are expected to report income earned to the IRS after

\$600 (via a 1099-MISC form), a large majority of hosts may be outside the law. In that, Airbnb only issues 1099-K tax forms to hosts who “earn over \$20,000 and have 200+ transactions in the calendar year”.⁴ Outside of submitting 1099-K form to select operators, Airbnb passes on responsibility to hosts to report any income earned suggesting they consult a tax professional for income reporting assistance.

Figure 2.8. Percent of Hosts by Annual Revenue Earned



Source: AirDnA, Property Data, Retrieved 2017. Excludes Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham.

- **Transient lodging taxes (TLT) imposed on Airbnbs by the state generate substantial fiscal revenue.** The state, imposing a 1.8% TLT on an estimated \$82 million, earned approximately \$1.5 million from Airbnb STRs in the last year. Still, Oregon’s TLT rate is much lower as compared to other state levied taxes on this same lodging type. Of the states which levy one or more state taxes on Airbnbs, rates range from 1.8% to 14.5% and average about 8%.⁵
- **Many cities do not levy TLTs on STRs.** Airbnb indicates that nine cities⁶ levy a tax on STRs marketed through their site, averaging 8.5% and ranging from 4% to 10.4%.⁷ If all remaining cities levied just a 5% local option levy/TLT on STRs, an additional, aggregated \$2 million could be earned (estimate). This would be in addition to the \$4 million already being earned by cities who do charge a TLT or similar tax on STRs. I note the discrepancy that while Airbnb indicates that nine cities levy a tax on STRs, the Responding to Short Term Rentals in Oregon Survey found that 21 communities levy a tax on STRs. This suggests that many communities

⁴ AirBnB. Should I expect to receive a tax form from Airbnb? Retrieved May 2017.

<https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/414/should-i-expect-to-receive-a-tax-form-from-airbnb>

⁵ AirBnB. In what areas is occupancy tax collection and remittance by Airbnb available? Retrieved May 5, 2017. <https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/653/in-what-areas-is-occupancy-tax-collection-and-remittance-by-airbnb-available>

⁶ Cities are: Beaverton, Bend, Cottage Grove, Eugene, Florence, Lincoln City, Newport, Portland, Springfield. Counties were Lane, Multnomah, Tillamook, and Washington.

⁷ AirBnB. In what areas is occupancy tax collection and remittance by Airbnb available? Retrieved May 5, 2017. <https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/653/in-what-areas-is-occupancy-tax-collection-and-remittance-by-airbnb-available>

imposing a STR/TLT tax have not communicated this information to STR web-based platforms like Airbnb.

To what extent do short-term rentals constrain the supply of housing?

Communities across Oregon are concerned whether STRs constrain the supply of housing (long-term rentals, owner-occupied units, workforce or affordable housing, etc.). This section provides some evidence to get us closer to understanding this impact.

- **Half of all STRs are reserved for less than 30 days (36% are reserved for 10 or fewer days).** As Table 2.12 on the following page shows, 28% of STRs are reserved for 30 to 90 days, 17% are reserved for 91 to 180 days, and 5% are reserved for 180 days or more. The average reservation day across the state is 52 days in a calendar year.
- **In more urbanized regions such as Portland Metro and Willamette Valley, STRs are operated as private rooms slightly more than as entire homes.** In Central Oregon and the North Coast, STRs are being operated more commonly as entire homes, providing some indication of the type of space available (e.g. more second homes, vacation houses, etc.), see Table 2.12.

Table 2.12. Airbnbs Organized by Listing Type, Days Reserved, and Region

Reservation Days	Entire Home/Apt.	Private Room	Shared Room	Total
Central Oregon	2,264	624	17	2,905
Less than 30 Days	35%	11%	1%	46%
30 to 90 Days	26%	5%	0%	32%
91 to 180 Days	13%	4%	0%	17%
181 Days or More	4%	1%	0%	5%
North Coast Oregon	1,483	228	9	1,720
Less than 30 Days	38%	6%	0%	44%
30 to 90 Days	24%	3%	0%	27%
91 to 180 Days	18%	3%	0%	21%
181 Days or More	6%	1%	0%	7%
Northeast Oregon	150	80	3	233
Less than 30 Days	29%	25%	1%	55%
30 to 90 Days	21%	6%	0%	27%
91 to 180 Days	12%	3%	0%	16%
181 Days or More	3%	0%	0%	3%
Portland Metro	434	591	27	1,052
Less than 30 Days	21%	34%	2%	57%
30 to 90 Days	9%	15%	1%	25%
91 to 180 Days	8%	5%	0%	13%
181 Days or More	3%	2%	0%	5%
South Coast Oregon	232	76	1	309
Less than 30 Days	36%	12%	0%	48%
30 to 90 Days	23%	8%	0%	31%
91 to 180 Days	13%	4%	0%	16%
181 Days or More	4%	1%	0%	5%
Southeast Oregon	135	34	1	170
Less than 30 Days	41%	11%	1%	52%
30 to 90 Days	25%	3%	0%	28%
91 to 180 Days	12%	6%	0%	19%
181 Days or More	1%	0%	0%	1%
Southern Oregon	441	318	10	769
Less than 30 Days	28%	24%	1%	52%
30 to 90 Days	14%	9%	0%	23%
91 to 180 Days	12%	7%	0%	19%
181 Days or More	4%	2%	0%	6%
Willamette Valley	476	484	14	974
Less than 30 Days	23%	28%	1%	53%
30 to 90 Days	14%	13%	0%	27%
91 to 180 Days	9%	7%	0%	17%
181 Days or More	2%	1%	0%	3%
Total	69%	30%	1%	8,132
Less than 30 Days	32%	17%	1%	49%
30 to 90 Days	21%	7%	0%	28%
91 to 180 Days	13%	5%	0%	17%
181 Days or More	4%	1%	0%	5%

Source: AirDnA. Airbnb property level data. Retrieved 2017. Excludes Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham.

- Perhaps a more accurate determination of housing supply constraints is the ratio of STRs (entire homes, rented for more than 30 days per year) to total housing units. Using this ratio to measure supply constraints, STRs account for approximately 2% of total housing in the North Coast and approximately 1.8% in Central Oregon. Remaining regions attribute to less than 1%.
- For most case study cities, data suggests that STRs are constraining the supply of long-term housing. Hood River, Joseph, and Seaside's housing stock are particularly influenced by STRs (see Table 2.13 or Appendix A, Table B.7).

Table 2.13. Indication of STRs Potentially Constraining Housing Supply

Case Studies	Airbnbs (Entire Home, Rented for 30+ Days)	% of Total Housing Units	Airbnbs (Entire Home, Rented for 91+ Days)	% of Total Housing Units
Ashland	92	1%	59	1%
Bend	997	3%	370	1%
Depoe Bay	56	4%	28	2%
Hood River	108	34%	47	15%
Joseph	41	7%	21	4%
Lincoln City	154	2%	65	1%
Manzanita	45	4%	20	2%
Rockaway Beach	63	3%	38	2%
Seaside	215	5%	18	0%
Sisters	43	3%	43	3%
Total	1,814	3%	709	1%

Source: AirDnA Property Data, Retrieved 2017.

- In case study cities, STR growth is increasing at a faster rate than total housing units are (see Appendix B, Table B.5). In some of these communities, household formation is also increasing at a faster rate than the construction of new housing units, indicating housing supply constraints (Bend, Depoe Bay, Joseph, and Manzanita).
- Property owners in resort communities (see Appendix B, Table B.6) can generate more annual revenue off STRs than they can off standard long-term rental units. Therefore, in these communities, there may be more of a motive for property owners to operate STRs (although the differential in time and cost of maintenance for long-term vs short-term rentals is unknown).

What are the existing perceptions around short-term rentals in Oregon?

Using the Responding to Short-Term Rental Survey, analysis can delve into the existing perceptions that communities hold over STRs.

- In general, survey respondents indicated that while residents shared mixed perceptions about STRs, local elected officials and businesses within the accommodation sector viewed

STRs as less problematic. Still, respondents who indicated that STRs may be more problematic in their own community than in other Oregon communities or comparable communities across the U.S., tended to agree or strongly agree that STRs impacted the availability of affordable and workforce housing (78%), long-term rental housing (78%), and owner-occupied housing (56%).

- **STRs provide great benefits including their ability to provide transient lodging tax revenue, to support tourism activities, and to support communities that rely on tourism.** For instance, they serve a market need by providing additional lodging options (especially for communities without any traditional accommodation types) and thus, they bring in tourists that might not have otherwise visited. Furthermore, they provide income and employment opportunities, allowing homeowners to get extra use out of their properties (thereby making homes more affordable).
- **STRs economically weaken communities by impacting resources such as the availability of housing (especially affordable and rental housing) and police and city staff time who deal with complaints from neighbors/business owners.** On the latter point, slightly over half of survey respondents indicated that residents have raised nuisance issues within the last five years. Among the cited nuisance complaints include: parking concerns (78%), noise concerns (67%), garbage and outdoor clutter concerns (56%), high occupancy levels (48%), and excessive parking (45%). Furthermore, respondents indicated concern over the possibility that hosts could be individuals or companies from out of the state that take their revenue with them. Finally, respondents indicated that STRs can economically weaken communities in that they tend to be operated seasonally creating periods of no economic stimulation followed by a community that falters in the off-season.
- **Respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with that statement that STRs evaded policies and regulations in their communities (26%) still did not all agree that their policies were ineffective.** In that, of that 26%, approximately 20% indicated their policy was somewhat effective, 44% indicated their policy was neither effective nor ineffective, and 36% indicated their policy was somewhat (16%) or very ineffective (20%).
- **Communities who do not see the need to regulate indicated that STRs are either not a problem in their community (e.g. there are no STRs or not enough STRs to regulate) or that STRs fit in with the character of their community and therefore regulation is not necessary.** Other reasons why communities have not pursued regulation was the issue has not been raised by community members or that staff resources and time was preventing them from adopting policies.
- **Most communities who will potentially develop ordinances to regulate STRs in the next five years will do so primarily to formalize the process and rules associated with it, legitimize existing situations, develop clear and objective standards, and promote fairness.** Still, some respondents indicated wanting regulations as the STR trend is increasing and they want to mitigate impact before STRs become a burden, or because they do not want to be overrun by STRs. The desire to reap transient tax revenue was also a common motivation for regulation.

How are short-term rentals currently being regulated in Oregon?

The Responding to Short-Term Rentals in Oregon Survey also provided information about existing ways STRs are being regulated in the state. The following provides some information about prevailing policy frameworks.

- **STRs are commonly referred to as transient rental or vacation rentals.** Less commonly, some refer to STRs as traveler/accessory traveler accommodations, bed and breakfasts, motels, or RV parks. Some of these less common terms (e.g. RV parks) are used in lieu of a term specific to STRs as policies have not caught up to this housing trend.
- **STRs are most commonly defined as units rented for less than 30 days.** Some policies indicate that they must be rented for a certain number of days before qualifying as a STR (e.g. at least 10 days in a calendar year). Lease type (e.g. less than a month-to-month basis) was also found to be used.
- **Most regulations for STR require that operators have a license and/or permit (92%) and 81% of respondents also indicated that their community imposes a transient lodging tax (or similar tax).** While fees vary widely, by cost and by type (e.g. conditional use permit, short-term rental licenses, business license, etc.) tax rates tend to remain more consistent (see Table 2.10). The following table provides some data on fees and tax rates.

Table 2.10. Frequency for Fee and Tax Rates


Fee Rate Frequency			Tax Rate Frequency	
Mean	\$	498	Mean	7.4%
Median	\$	358	Median	7.5%
Standard Deviation	\$	554	Standard Deviation	2.3%
Range	\$	2,150	Range	8.6%
Min	\$	50	Min	1.8%
Max	\$	2,200	Max	10.4%

Source: Responding to Short-Term Rentals in Oregon Survey, y-Q20 and y- Q21, 2017.

- **Respondents also commonly regulate STRs by relying on concentration caps/limits or occupancy requirements.** Restricting STRs to certain zones, adopting guest behavior standards, or making properties subject to review and inspection (making determinations on case-by-case basis) have also been put into place to mitigate nuisance and promote health, safety, and wellbeing.
- **Most respondents (60%) find their regulations for STRs, or lack thereof, to be neither effective nor ineffective in managing the economic benefits or negative impacts of short-term rentals.** Approximately 21% found their regulations, or lack thereof, to be very or somewhat effective and 18% found them very or somewhat ineffective. Still, we note that a generous portion of those that found their policies/lack of policies to be neither effective or ineffective did not actually have any regulatory framework. This can be explained in that many smaller communities in Oregon still do not have many STRS (if any) and thus, do not have many of the same concerns as other communities (e.g. around nuisance issues or

housing supply concerns), see Figure 2.11. Noting that STRs are uncharted territory for many cities, it may take time to adopt the appropriate regulatory framework that works best for each community.

Figure 2.11. Effectiveness of Short-Term Rental Ordinance or Lack of Ordinance



Source: Responding to Short-Term Rentals in Oregon Survey, Q25, 2017.

- **STR ordinances were most commonly enforced by issuances of administrative citations (62%) and fines (58%).** In addition, many respondents commented on the fact that enforcement was a challenge.

Chapter 3: Conclusions

This chapter deliberates the findings discussed in chapter 2 and uses the literature review in Appendix A to provide some theoretical underpinnings. Primarily, this chapter discusses best ways Oregon planners and policy makers can respond to STRs, should they want to. Examples are provided throughout to enhance understanding or to provide those interested with more information. However, explicit recommendations are laid out in the following chapter. Smaller jurisdictions outside of Oregon and across the United States may also find use out of these best practices. Finally, this chapter outlines possible, future steps for continued research on this topic to ensure more accurate policy responses.

How should policy makers and planners in Oregon respond to short-term rentals?


We know that the solution to STRs will be different for every city. What is true for Oregon is true for communities across the United States: STRs affect cities dissimilarly and, in turn, they view STRs diversely. Accordingly, many communities have taken the experimental and incremental approach, not knowing if their policy will truly mitigate the impacts and/or enable the benefits hoped for but needing to trial something. Performance of STR policies are still unknown. We need more data and rigorous statistical research to measure the impacts and policy treatments given. In the meantime, and while much is still unknown, following some general best practices to manage STRs may prove fruitful.

In Oregon, I find that when linking existing policy to perceptions, in general, policy reactions have met community reactions. In that, communities unchallenged by STRs (or where STRs are not a community concern) tend to be undaunted by the need to regulate, as an existing practice or as a future precaution. Communities, who are challenged by STRs (at any extreme) and/or where community members (residents, local elected officials, etc.) have raised the issue, have generally adopted or amended their regulations recently (since 2000) or are planning to in the next five years.

Inclusivity is the key to construct equitable regulations that are less likely to be evaded and more likely to mitigate the negative externalities created by these policies. Research has already posited four broad approaches to regulation: centralized regulation, self-regulation, no regulation, and shared regulation (see Figure 3.1 on the following page). Shared regulation, deemed the most effective approach, is intuitive to regulatory best practices generally, in which policies for STRs should be no different. Including local community members and business stakeholders in discussions about regulation is valuable. Not only will this approach generate stronger regulations but policy makers can also learn the ways in which people in their community want take part in this sharing economy activity.

“Users in particular should be at the centre [sic] of the regulatory process because they could play a greater role in compliance”
(Balaram, 2016).

Table 3.1. Broad Approaches to Regulate Short-Term Rentals



Source: Balaram, Brhmie (2016). <https://www.thersa.org/discover/publications-and-articles/rsa-blogs/2016/07/how-do-we-collaboratively-regulate-the-sharing-economy>

Accordingly, regulation should be a part of a community conversation as it is necessary to understand the true impacts that STRs have on hosts, accommodation sector businesses, and residents. Regulation should be a part of a regional conversation as most areas in Oregon receive regional tourism, and therefore regulatory frameworks in one community (e.g. the option of banning outright) can have unintended consequences on nearby jurisdictions (e.g. increasing STRs usage potentially affecting their housing availability more than otherwise). Ideally, sharing economy platforms should be involved too. For instance, policy makers and policy monitors need big data to construct useful regulatory frameworks and these platforms have this missing piece. Jurisdictions having access to audited, databases or summary data will help improve the way local governments manage STRs (Sundararajan, 2016).⁸

Thus, while community and regional conversations should be a given, additional approaches are more variable. Compiled below are several, general, best practices. Jurisdictions should consider these practices by reviewing them in context of their community.

Define Short-Term Rentals Codify Regulations in City Ordinances

The first step in attempting to respond to STRs is to have it defined in an ordinance. Many communities have no framework in place to address STRs which has presented challenges in mitigating issues that arise. Some communities, lacking an appropriate definition have relied on similar lodging terminology, such as temporary living accommodations (e.g. hotels, motels, extended-stay hotels, etc.), to address issues that arise but this is not an adequate practice for the

⁸ STRs data is becoming increasingly easy to access free of charge or for predetermined prices. Collaborating with academic institutions can help reduce the cost of data, and if purchased on a state or regional level, can reduce the price on a per capita basis.

long term. STRs are different than traditional lodging and should be regulated accordingly. The best approach is to define the use as “short-term rentals.” Terminology such as vacation rental should also be reconsidered as it implies that these units are only used for tourism or recreational purposes. In actuality, STRs are used by those on prolonged business trips or by existing or potential residents who are in the process of looking for housing in a particular community and therefore uninterested in a long-term lease.

In addition to terminology, a frequency of use standard should be determined. The common standard is less than 30 days in a calendar year or less than 30 consecutive days but this can vary and allow for more flexibility. As best practice, generate official designation in conjunction with a local, community conversation and a regional conversation. Communities where STRs are not highly prevalent may fair well with a looser standard (e.g. less than 120 days in a calendar year) while other communities may enforce a stricter standard (e.g. less than 15 days in a calendar year).

Once defined, this activity will become easier to classify and regulate usage. It also legitimizes STRs so residents who want to operate a STR can do so legally. Equally important, this becomes the only way for communities to collect taxes on STRs. Despite commentary of communities that lack any STRs (in reality or as perceived) indicating there is no need to regulate, any community with residencies can, at any time—be affected by STRs. Therefore, the growing trend of STRs requires communities to take precaution and be proactive.

The following are examples of definitions for local, Oregon ordinances:

- City of Gearhart: “Vacation Rental Dwelling. Any structure, or any portion of any structure, which is occupied or offered or designed for transient occupancy for less than 30 days for dwelling, lodging or sleeping purposes; and includes houses, cabins, condominiums, apartment units or other dwelling units, or portions of any of these dwelling units, that are used for temporary human occupancy, provided such occupancy is less than a 30-day period.”
- City of McMinnville: “Vacation Home Rental. The Use of a dwelling unit by any person or group of persons entitled to occupy for rent for a period of less than 21 (twenty-one) consecutive days.”
- City of Manzanita: “Short Term Rental. A dwelling unit that is rented to any person on a day to day basis or for a period of less than thirty (30) consecutive nights.”

Distinguish Between Short-Term Rentals

While all STRs function similarly, they are not all the same. STRs can be an entire home, or a shared/private room. They can be located in the main house/apartment or be located in a secondary dwelling on the property. Further, some STRs are used for a single night or a weekend while others can be reserved for several weeks to a month at a time. In addition to duration, frequency also distinguishes STRs in that a neighbor may not notice a single tourist or family who have rented out a house for a weekend but may notice when there are new visitors every week or more than 30 visitors/new families in a single year.

Thus, policies that differentiate between types of STRs will promote fairness and equitability. Tiered restrictions can be used to make it less financially burdensome on property owners who are interested in renting out their home for less than 10 days in a calendar year compared to high volume owners (someone who rents their home out two to three times for 30 consecutive days in a calendar year). Per example, “raising the cost for high volume listings of short-term apartments to the point where long-term residential leases become more profitable” can be considered a useful strategy to discourage “hotelization” (Katz, 2015). With that, more lenient requirement for those renting out a single room can encourage property efficiency. For communities with affordable housing issues, higher fees for STRs in accessory/secondary dwelling units may incentivize property owners to use that valuable space for full-time residents as opposed to visitors. There should also be a distinction between certain STRs and second homes⁹.

For an example, visit the City of Ashland’s Development code which differentiates between “Travelers’ Accommodations” and “Accessory Travelers’ Accommodations.”

- http://www.ashland.or.us/SIB/files/AMC_Chpt_18_current.pdf (18.2.3.200)

Restrict Use or Incentivize Moderate Use

Literature attests that the ‘banning STR outright’ policy response will not likely fix housing availability or affordability issues due the amount of STRs there are in most cities (small portion, comparatively). Further, literature hypothesizes that banning outright can have more unintended, negative repercussions by preventing the positive aspects that the sharing economy brings to residents and local economies via this tourism niche (Short Term Rental Advocacy Center). This is not to say that banning is not a legitimate policy approach particularly in areas in a housing crisis. However, in smaller jurisdictions, where neighborhoods are less dense and where housing tends to have larger footprints, banning outright can also disallow efficient uses of individual properties. Accordingly, I provide two alternative options that may better enable the benefits of STRs while still allowing proper management of STRs (see Figure 3.2). Regulatory paths for each option are laid out in the following chapter.

⁹ Hood River, Oregon makes this distinction in their 2015 Housing Needs Assessment. This STR/second home distinction is valuable as their uses have different sets of implications. With that said, a second home has more impact on the availability of housing than does a STR in a room of somebody’s primary dwelling.

Figure 3.2. Alternatives to the Policy Option of Banning Short-Term Rentals

Restrict Use	Incentivize Moderate Use
<p>Purpose: to limit the number of short-term rentals in a community or in particular areas of a community</p> <p>Advantages: systematically controls the prevalence and influence of short-term rentals</p> <p>Disadvantages: potential for policy evasion; concerns over fairness (who is allowed to participate)</p> <p>Example: In Manzanita, Oregon short-term rentals are allowed outright with a percentage cap on the number of short-term rentals permitted in some areas. A waiting list is used for eligible homeowners who would otherwise be eligible for a license to operate.</p> <p>More information: Manzanita, Oregon. Ordinance No. 10-03 (As amended by Ord. No. 16-05 12/7/16), "An Ordinance Establishing Rules and Regulations Relating to Short Term Rentals"</p>	<p>Purpose: to encourage property owners to responsibly limit how they use their properties as short-term rentals</p> <p>Advantages: preserves property rights; permits efficient use of participating properties</p> <p>Disadvantages: potential for property owners to choose not to moderate use (especially those with higher-incomes)</p> <p>Example: In Portland, Maine, annual registration fees for non-owner occupied short-term rentals are twice as expensive than those for owner occupied units. In addition, fees increase for each unit (e.g. ranging from \$100 for the first unit to \$2,000 for the fifth unit for owner-occupied units and \$200 for the first unit to \$4,000 for the fifth unit for non-owner occupied units).</p> <p>More information: Portland, Maine. Amendment to Portland City Code Chapter 6 and Chapter 14, Re: Short Term Rentals. http://portlandmaine.gov/Document-Center/Home/View/15848</p>

Source: DiNatale, Sadie (2017). Assessing and Responding to Short-Term Rentals: Enabling the Benefits of the Sharing Economy.

These progressive options help to “ensure that people only occasionally rent out their house whilst away (sharing economy), rather than run a permanent, unregulated hotel (not sharing economy)” by regulating “the rental of homes in such a way that it becomes part of the sharing economy as previously defined” (Frenken, et al. 2015). Determination about what route local government should take is contingent upon the way in which property owners operate STRs in that community as well as the perceptions community members have for STRs. Either option, will require evaluation to ensure that the intended outcome has been achieved.

It may be that STRs are not an existing problem, or that STRs receive praise for providing lodging opportunities where no traditional lodging options were available (etc.). In community situations like these, there may be no need to restrict use or incentive moderate use.

Normalize STRs as a Residential Activity (with Caveats)

Another point of controversy and debate is whether to classify STRs as a residential or commercial use. This determination will have huge implications in how STRs are used, and who can use them. On one end, STRs provides a property owner with employment while technically using their home as a small, business venture (though not to the degree of a hotel or motel). On the other hand, STRs are located in residencies, function residentially (e.g. used for eating, sleeping, hanging out), and the rental units maintain their residential character. Normalizing STRs as a residential activity, with regulatory caveats that ensures property owners maintain the properties' residential character (see subsection, "Develop Appropriate Regulatory Standards") can ensure that those who use STRs moderately and within legal parameters can continue to do so.

The following outlines some court cases in which STRs were determined a residential activity:

- *"Short-term rentals of lakefront house are not commercial use in violation of residential zoning laws, for the purpose that residential referred to activities on the property and not the owners' intent to make a profit, there was never more than on family occupying the house, and the renters engaged in residential activities."*
 - *Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes*, Court of Appeals of Indiana [intermediate court], Decided March 16, 2010, 922 N.E.2d 751. (Judicial Decision: 62 PEL 210, Indiana.)
- *Short-term rental determined predominately residential* for the reasons that "the property was designed for use predominately as a residence, the site was purchased and the home was built for personal use, the intent was to use the property as a second home, the decision to allow short-term rentals was made to offset expenses and to share the outdoor experience with visitors, most of the rental activity occurred during the summer months, [the property owners] used the property when possible." Further, "the receipt of income does not transform residential use of property into commercial use" (*Farny v. Board of Equalization*). Finally, the intent was not to generate profit (as is the case of hotels, motels, and bed and breakfasts) but to assist with the cost of maintenance.
 - *O'Neil v. Conejos County Board of Commissions*, Court of Appeals of Colorado, Decided March 9, 2017.
- Piece of a condominium declaration "affirming that no business, trade, occupation or profession of any kind shall be conducted, maintained or permitted on any part of the property was not intended to restrict the right of any condominium unit owner to rent or lease his condominium unit from time to time." In addition to restrictive covenants not being favored in Missouri, "the covenant was interpreted narrowly in favor of the free use of the property and that nightly rentals did not violate the R-3 multiple-family dwellings statute."
 - *Mullin v. Silvercreek Condominium Owner's*, 195 S.W.3d 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006):

Still, depending on the political climate and level of controversy in a given community, limiting STRs to specific zones (e.g. mixed-use, neighborhood commercial, higher or lower density residential areas) may prove to be a useful compromise or solution (also see next subsection "Permit STRs in Premium Areas with Monitoring"). Further, in some situations restrictive covenants (in Home Owners Associations, for example) may view STRs as a breach of rules and landlords may still prohibit their tenants from operating short-term rentals in the same way they may prohibit sub-leasing. Accordingly, some management of STRs can occur outside of municipal control.

Permit STRs in Premium Areas with Monitoring

If community conversations come to the conclusion that STRs are to be limited to certain areas of a community, consider permitting the use of STRs in premium areas. In this sense, premium areas can be considered areas of city with abundant natural resources: places tourists and visitors flock to where STRs tend to be most prevalent. Allowing STRs in these areas are in line with sharing economy values. In that, more people are given access to homes in superior locations.

Still, as communities with these premium areas (e.g. resort communities) are facing greater challenges than non-resort communities, paying attention to the number and use of STRs in these areas is important as allowing them without management may disrupt the character of those neighborhoods (see next subsection, “Develop Appropriate Regulatory Standards”).

Develop Appropriate Regulatory Standards

In considering STRs as a residential use, it is important to set specific standards on these units to ensure they are not overly burdensome to the neighborhood. For instance, limiting guest capacity to the family/household capacity, quantifying the frequency and duration of visitor stays, and fining property owners for created nuisances are some options for maintaining the character of neighborhoods. In respects to the quantification of frequency and duration of visitors, one can equate the number of days the property is rented to the number of days the property is owner-occupied. In areas with constrained housing availability, requiring that property owners live in their dwelling unit for six to nine months out of the year, for example, can disincentive the hotelization of neighborhoods.

Finally, requiring that STR units receive inspections should also be a minimum to promote the health, safety, and wellbeing of both residents and visitors. Inspections could include a general home inspection or a fire inspection.

Require a Permit or License

Requiring STR operators to register their units or get a permit/license can help communities stay on top of where these rentals are located and can help manage how many there are. It will also allow communities to collect data (aiding in the chance to measure the benefits/costs that STRs could have on neighborhoods, hosts, and/or residents). Collecting fees from these permits/licenses can be low (solely used to cover the administrative cost of processing permits/licenses) or higher if excess revenue is needed for other initiatives (STR education, outreach, inspection services or complaint follow-up, etc.). Requiring STR operators to register for a business permit (as opposed to getting a permit specially designated for STRs) may also prove to be less administratively burdensome.

An example of language for requiring a short-term rental license is as follows:

- City of Bend (7.16.030): “Annual Short-Term Rental Operating License Required. No owner of property within the Bend City limits may advertise, offer, operate, rent, or otherwise make available or allow any other person to make available for occupancy or use a short-term rental without a short-term rental operating license. Advertise or offer includes through any media, whether written, electronic, web-based, digital, mobile or otherwise. [Ord. NS-2239, 2015]”

Require STR Operators to Pay Fees and Taxes

Tourism often puts a strain on services. Collecting fees and taxes should be used to mitigate negative externalities of this activity. Fees, as mentioned briefly above, should cover the cost of administrator time and resources needed to regulate and enforce STRs as well as cover outreach activities.

Transient lodging taxes should be levied in all communities using a rate that makes sense for the community (e.g. higher if there are too many STRs or lower if the community does not have sufficient lodging opportunities/wants to encourage STRs). There are also precedents for alleviating costs for lower-income households that may be impacted by these rates dissimilarly; for instance, a fee exemption or reduced fee rate. Higher fee rates for property owners with more than one STR in a single community may also help to disincentive “hotelization.”¹⁰

How should planners and policy makers enforce short-term rentals?

While not all jurisdictions in Oregon have to deal with enforcement issues, those that do understand that enforcement of STR policies is difficult at best and traditional methods such as administrative citations, fines, revoking permits, or court mandates have only been slightly effective overall in curbing code evasion.

Still, opportunities for enforcement exist, however, they may not be in line with traditional best practices. For instance, while more time intensive, providing outreach to community members is one opportunity to ensure that residents and possible hosts understand their rights when it comes to STRs. Reaching out to community members about what existing regulatory frameworks are and

“What’s striking about the shared economy is not the technology that has made it possible, but the vast changes it has triggered in society.”
(Stan, 2016).

what they are intended to accomplish can help inform residents and potential hosts of the standard operating procedures for the area. Teaching them of the negative externalities (specific to the community) may help with compliance. Additionally, with “community” and “trust” as cornerstones of the sharing economy, using these values to frame community discussions may also prove to be more effective than addressing this activity from a strictly legal and economic agenda. Outreach to educate operators about

the hazards of being an absentee property owner and the danger of allowing visitors to stay longer than 30 consecutive days (e.g. risks visitors gaining tenant’s rights) should also occur.

Using regional outreach methods may help ease administrative burden, especially in areas with smaller populations. Alternatively, local governments can offset some of this outreach onto property owners by requiring them to reach out to their neighbors before registering their STRs (e.g. potentially requesting neighbor approval or confirmation that hosts at least speak to their neighbors about their new venture). This option can give property owners and neighbors a chance to talk

¹⁰ Recently, Paris triples its vacant home tax to 60% to mitigate artificial shortages in their housing stock. <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-03-07/vacant-homes-are-global-epidemic-and-paris-fighting-it-60-tax>

about concerns before the opportunity for nuisances to occur arises. This will enable trust and transparency.

Along the lines of trust and transparency, the sharing economy has become effective at self-regulation. In general, web-based platforms that utilize customer review and rating systems can allow property owners to be more selective of who they let into their homes and neighborhoods. Again, educating hosts in some of the dangers that could occur through home-sharing may make the hosts more perceptive to these review/rating systems. Further, if these hosts have previously talked to their neighbors about their primary concerns, hosts will be able to read through potential visitor's reviews to better select individuals less likely to create the nuisances sure to annoy neighbors.

In summation, it is difficult for governments to regulate something they do not have complete control over. Using community members to encourage and expect appropriate use of STRs as well as educating STR operators on what is suitable can induce a culture of self-regulated compliance.

The Need for Continuous Evaluation

Not just a best practice but a necessity, jurisdictions should continue to monitor STRs in their community so that appropriate evaluation of their policies can occur. Particularly, many cities have found their regulations, or lack thereof, to be neither effective nor ineffective, which makes continued evaluation that much more important.

Potential opportunities to inaugurate monitoring and evaluation into existing administrative and planning activities includes: inventorying STRs when participating in buildable lands inventories or conducting housing needs assessments, considering STRs when developing regional plans or new master plans (particularly for downtowns and tourism-based districts), and incorporating STRs into relevant strategic plans (e.g. Travel Oregon) and state-wide tourism research. Further, using town halls, neighborhood association meetings, existing community newsletters, polls on governmental Facebook pages, and the like can streamline outreach activities just as easily as it can assist in gauging community perspectives about STRs. Longitudinal studies will be essential to truly gauge the effectiveness of STR policies.

Future Research

As other studies on the topic conclude, there is still much research needed regarding the topics of STRs and the sharing economy to understand their impact on communities and local economies. The following questions were unable to be addressed in this report but should be considered moving forward (see Table 3.3):

Table 3.3. Opportunities for Continued Study

Research Questions	Potential Method(s)	Potential Data Sources
Do short-term rentals affect the availability of long-term rentals, owner-occupied housing, or affordable housing? If so, to what extent?	Regression Analysis	American Community Survey and Housing Survey Data
Do short-term rentals affect property values or inflate rental costs?	Regression Analysis	American Community Survey and Housing Survey Data
What is the land use efficiency of short-term rentals vs. hotel/motel accommodations?	Geographic Information Systems; Static and Dynamic Analysis	Historical rates of land consumption, Residential and accommodation sector employment growth rates/trends of land utilization, Characteristics of land and tax lot information
In allowing STRs to support additional tourism, do the benefits derived from an increase in tourism outweigh the costs of increased tourism?	Cost-Benefit Analysis	Government spending and tax revenue; Economic, social, and environmental indicators
How can web-based, sharing economy businesses, governments, and community members collaborate in the response to short-term rentals?	Surveys, Interviews, Focus Groups	Residents, Businesses within the accommodation sector, Elected officials, Government representatives, Sharing economy platforms
How do community members perceive short-term rentals in their community?	Surveys (e.g. chi-square), Interviews, Focus Groups	Residents, Businesses within the accommodation sector, Elected officials
To what extent do community members value home-sharing? In what ways do values differ amongst various groups?	Surveys (e.g. chi-square), Interviews, Focus Groups	Residents and Community members
What are the motives of property owners who operate a short-term rental(s)? How do motives rank amongst each other?	Surveys, Interviews, Focus Groups	Short-term rental operators

Source: DiNatale, Sadie. (2017). Assessing and Responding to Short-Term Rentals in Oregon: Enabling the Benefits of the Sharing Economy.

Additionally, many survey respondents indicated the following summarized tools would be helpful for them to better respond to STRs¹¹:

- Construction of a model code or sample ordinance¹²
- Easier access to Transient Lodging Tax rolls to establish whether STRs exist in certain locations or are contributing taxes
- Access to housing data (e.g. spatial data of housing stock)
- Funding to amend land use codes

¹¹ Responding to Short-Term Rentals in Oregon Survey, n-Q24, 2017.

¹² Two potential sample codes are located here: <http://stradvocacy.org/category/sample-ordinances/>. Many cities in Oregon have also adopted codes that could be used as a resource. When developing code language, looking at samples from a range of comparable jurisdictions is important.

Chapter 4: Policy Recommendations

The purpose of this chapter is not to recommend a precise recipe for how various communities should manage STRs; this would be inefficient given all the nuances between cities. Rather, this chapter presents general recommendations for cities (with populations less than 100,000), regions, and Oregon. Lastly, delineated in a typology (based-off previously cited best practice) are specific regulatory options that communities can consider.

Regulatory Recommendations

The following sections break recommendations into minimum requirements and ancillary requirements for cities. Next, I provide recommendations for regions and the State.

Minimum Regulatory Recommendations for All Cities

Whether a city has STRs or not, communities should establish the following regulations, even as a precautionary measure:

1. Legally define STRs as “short-term rentals” and establish a fair frequency of use standard that is complimentary of regional standards.
2. Codify regulations in local ordinance. Impose a guest capacity limit and require inspections.
3. Levy a transient lodging tax (if not imposed at the county level).
4. Require that STR operators register their unit(s) on an annual basis.

Ancillary Regulatory Recommendation with Thresholds for Cities

Variations in number and concentration of STRs should influence policy choices. The following recommendations provide thresholds for ancillary regulations as a starting point. In that, thresholds may vary between communities.

1. Restrict (cap/limit) STRs or incentivize moderate use if STRs account for more than 4% of total housing stock.
2. Impose a clause that revokes a STR permit for properties that receive more than five nuisance complaints in a calendar year.
3. Limit STRs in proximity to other STRs (deconcentrate) when city-wide/area-specific nuisance complaints exceed 25 complaints in a calendar year. Communities should establish a fair distance (e.g. 50 to 200 feet buffer between STRs), weigh equity implications, and re-evaluate buffer distance every two to five years.
 - a. Before establishing a buffer distance, cities should increase regulatory standards and evaluate whether nuisance complaints reduce (e.g. establishing minimum parking standards may mitigate parking complaints).

Recommendations for Counties and Regions

Smaller jurisdictions may have difficulties managing STRs. That said, counties/regions should help facilitate proper management of STRs.

1. Levy a transient lodging tax at the county level if barriers exist for cities to impose their own (due to population size, low prevalence of STRs in individual communities, administrative limitations, etc.).
2. Establish a regional representative or liaison to attend Sharing Economy Committee meetings (see first “Recommendation for Oregon”). Regional liaisons should represent multiple counties.

Recommendations for Oregon

Oregon can and should become a leader in the management of STRs. This will require the state to become a leader in sharing economy affairs.

1. Establish a Sharing Economy Committee to facilitate research on the sharing economy generally (to include analysis of STR trends) and to assist communities across the state deal with new issues. The objective of this committee should be one in support of sharing economy activities.
2. Hire a state employee to work directly in sharing economy affairs. Responsibilities should include:
 - Analyze sharing economy trends across the state, country, and globe
 - Communicate initiatives, information, and best practices to governments across the state
 - Provide government assistance in STR management
 - Collaborate with sharing-economy platforms
 - Collect data
 - Participate in global sharing economy networks
 - Coordinate state Sharing Economy Committee meetings, trainings, and workshops
 - Launch policy demonstration studies to pilot regulatory frameworks and options
3. Maintain a neutral Transient Lodging Tax at 1.8% to allow regions and cities to use their tax rates to manage STR growth.
4. Establish a pool of funding to help small communities amend land use ordinances for STRs.

Legislative Approaches: A Typology for Smaller Jurisdictions

The following policy options represent common legislative approaches for smaller jurisdictions. Communities must consider the viability of each approach/regulatory option within context of their community. A community may adopt some or none of these options. “Grade,” intends to provide a starting point for a community conversation around equitability of regulatory frameworks. Communities are encouraged to develop their own metrics or expand the following.

Table 4.1. Legislation Approaches and Regulatory Options

Legislative Approaches	Regulatory Options	Equity Consideration	Grade
Definitions	Terms	-	-
	Vacation Rental	Not an all-encompassing term; assumes use is tourism-based only.	Poor
	Transient Rental	Inclusive term.	Good
	Short-Term Rental	More inclusive term and observed globally.	Best
	Frequency of Use	-	-
	Unspecified	Not specifying the number of days STRs can be reserved for could create hotelization.	Poor to Adequate
	Less than 183 days in a calendar year; Less than 30 consecutive days	For communities unchallenged by housing availability, the use of second homes as STRs may be acceptable, for others, this could create artificial housing supply constraints.	Adequate
	Less than 90 days in a calendar year; Less than 30 consecutive days	Allowing STRs to be reserved for a total of 3 months in a calendar year enables property owners who may travel (or function with a more nomadic lifestyle) to get better use out of their primary properties while away.	Good
	Less than 30 days in a calendar year	More commonly used by local governments as a way to balance the benefits and negative externalities of STRs while continuing to learn from and evolve with the sharing economy.	Good
	Listing Types	-	-
	Accessory/Secondary Dwelling	Allowing STRs in ADUs can allow property owners to use their lots more efficiently. However, for communities with housing supply constraints, this may inhibit long-term housing options.	Adequate
	Entire House/Apartment	STRs as entire homes and apartments are efficient but frequent use could generate artificial housing shortages in some communities.	Good
	Shared/Private Room	Enabling STRs as shared/private rooms can make it easier for property owners to use their excess space.	Best

Legislative Approaches	Regulatory Options	Equity Consideration	Grade
Restrictive Zoning	Cap/Limit	-	-
	STRs in Proximity to Another	Mitigate nuisance issues and ensures certain areas of a community does not become overrun by STRs.	Good
	the Number of STRs in a City	Limiting STRs allows benefits to be reaped and greater flexibility. Using a lottery system or waiting list can promote fairness.	Good
	the Number of STRs in a Neighborhood or District	Allows for more accurate and fair management of STRs in areas that are more heavily influenced by STRs than others. Using a lottery system or waiting list can promote fairness.	Good
	Rentals per Property Owner	Reduces threat of hotelization in neighborhoods and better ensures an adequate supply of housing for residents.	Best
	Land Use Classes	-	-
	Banning Outright	Banning outright will likely lead to policy evasion and missing out on the many benefits the sharing economy brings.	Poor
	Permit Outright	Many communities may find it acceptable to allow STRs outright as long as appropriate regulatory standards mitigate concerns and promote fairness.	Good
	Permit in Some Districts/Zones	Being selective of where STRs are able to locate is important for most communities where STRs are creating issues. A cost-benefit analysis weighing the benefits/drawbacks of sharing economy activities in various areas is necessary to make informed decisions on behalf of the entire community.	Best
Incentive-Based Provisions	Higher Fee Rate	-	-
	for Second Permit or More	Making STR operators pay higher rates for STR permits, after their initial permit, can discourage property owners from operating more than one STR in a given community.	Good
	Reduced Fee Rate	-	-
	Property Owner's Primary Residence	Allowing reduced fares for STRs in operator's primary home can discourage people from purchasing residential units solely for the purpose of operating STRs.	Best
	Fee Exemptions	-	-
	for Hardship	Exempting residents experiencing financial hardship from fee requirements can ensure that lower-income residents can still operate a STR legally to earn extra income, if they want.	Best
	Use for less than 10 days in calendar year	Exempting operators from permit fees who operate STRs infrequently can ensure residents are not financially discouraged from use their properties more efficiently.	Best

Legislative Approaches	Regulatory Options	Equity Consideration	Grade
Permitting	Conditional Use Permit	High rates of standard conditional use permits may reduce STRs financial viability discouraging use, which may or may not be the intention. For moderate users this may induce concerns over fairness.	Adequate to Good
	Business License	Requiring STR operators to get a business license can streamline administrative efforts.	Good
	Short-Term Rental License	A separate license, specifically for short-term rentals, may allow more flexibility in treating this activity and in setting fee rates at more appropriate levels.	Best
Taxation	No Transient Lodging Tax	For some communities, levying a TLT may discourage STRs in areas where STRs' other benefits of STRs may outweigh the additional fiscal revenue.	Poor to Adequate
	Transient Lodging Tax Imposed by County	Counties where aggregated STRs in each city are too low to be administratively efficient to levy at a city level, may benefit from a tax levied at a regional level. Imposing a transient tax maintains fairness across the accommodation sector.	Good
	Transient Lodging Tax Imposed by City	Tourists put a strain on city services and cities should levy a tax to offset financial burden on residents. Imposing a transient tax maintains fairness across the accommodation sector.	Good
Registration	No Registration	Not requiring STRs to register may have long-term effects on the character of neighborhoods, on housing availability or affordability, and may make enforcement more difficult.	Poor
	Renewal Every 3 to 5 Years	Ensures process is not overly burdensome but less frequent monitoring may create opportunities for policy evasion and neighborhood nuisances.	Adequate
	Annual Renewal	Most appropriate way to track STRs on a regular basis.	Good
Review Processes	No Review Process	Not having any kind of review process may negatively influence the health, safety, or wellbeing of residents or the character of neighborhoods.	Poor
	Site/Design Review	While necessary depending on other regulatory options selected (e.g. conditional use permit) for other communities, a site/design review process may be overly burdensome to both staff and potential STR operators.	Adequate to Good
	Neighbor Consent	Some form of consent process with neighbors (not official hearing) can improve neighborhood relationships and increase transparency. Some nuisance issues may be mitigated with open dialogue.	Good
	Performance/Behavior Measures	Policies that revoke STR privileges for nuisance issues or complaints is a useful clause to ensure neighbors are not negatively impacted by STRs in nearby properties.	Good
	Health, Fire, Building Inspections	More of a necessity, there should be some checks and balances to ensure that STR properties are up to code, ensuring the safety of visitors.	Best

Legislative Approaches	Regulatory Options	Equity Consideration	Grade
Standards	Minimum Parking Requirements	Requiring that STR operators adhere to parking requirements may mitigate nuisance issues in some areas or be unnecessary and overly burdensome in others.	Poor to Adequate
	Vehicle Limits	Limiting guest vehicles can mitigate neighborhood concerns and nuisance issues.	Good
	Minimum Aesthetic Code Requirements	Some aesthetic requirements (e.g. limiting signage) can mitigate degradation of neighborhood character in primarily residential areas.	Good
	Proof of Owner-Occupancy	Requiring a property owner to use their property for a certain number of days out of a calendar year can discourage absentee property owners and hotelization.	Best
	Guest Capacity	Maintaining a guest capacity at level of family/household can mitigate nuisance issues and ensure that STRs in traditionally, residential areas are not overly disruptive to the existing character of neighborhoods.	Best

Source: Information was derived from Appendix A and B of this report as well as from the Responding to Short-Term Rentals in Oregon Survey.

Appendix A: Literature Review

This chapter organizes findings of existing studies and current literature on the topic of short-term rentals.

Impact of Short-Term Rentals

STRs are understood to impact, or potentially impact the cost and availability of housing, local economies, and the sharing economy generally.

Impact on Housing

A scan of applicable literature quickly returns results of short-term rentals (STRs) impact on housing. First however, most reports comment on the fact that there are very clear limitations in the availability of data to fully understand the impact STRs have on housing markets or housing stock (ECONorthwest 2016, Rees Consulting 2016, and accessorydwellings.org 2016). Speculation and inherent assumptions are widespread, though, academics and practitioners are eager to learn about the true effects. Being that there is no standard or agreed upon definition for STRs, the ability to draw clear conclusions on causality across space becomes especially difficult (ECONorthwest, 2016).

In a study that analyzed the impact that HomeAway rentals had in Seattle, it was found that STRs did not have a significant impact on home values, that properties were generally not on the STR market for long, and that STRs were generally located in traditionally higher income areas (ECONorthwest 2016). Yet, in a study of STRs in New York City and New Orleans, STRs were associated with increased property values (Sheppard, et al. 2016 and Kindel, et al. 2016). Thus, we can conclude that STRs' impact on housing will differ between geographic regions and local economy types.

Some reports looked at the impact STRs had on specific housing types. In a white paper looking at four cities in Colorado, with populations under 7,000, it was found that STRs did lead to the reduction of homes and bedrooms previously used by employees increasing the demand for workforce housing and reducing its supply (Rees Consulting 2016). Another analysis showed that in Portland, banning short-term accessory dwelling unit rentals did not increase long-term accessory dwelling rentals (accessorydwellings.org 2016).

Economic Impacts

Impacts to the Government and Local Economies: Short-term rentals have the potential to positively affect municipalities through production of fiscal revenue. In a report assessing the impact of STRs in San Diego, Los Angeles, Monterey County, Santa Barbara, and St. Joseph (Michigan) it was found that taxing the STR industry generates substantial revenue for the municipality and it does support job growth (NUSI 2015; TXP, Inc. 2014; and TXP, Inc. 2015). In addition, literature attests that “with proper regulation and enforcement, citizens and communities can benefit from the increased tourism” that short-term rentals bring (Binzer, 2017).

Impacts to Short-Term Rental Hosts: A primary reason property owners operate STRs is the income operators' can earn. Still, in a study of HomeAway rentals in Seattle, ECONorthwest found that STRs did not generate significant incomes for owners (2016) —potentially unveiling other value-drivers for operating STRs beside purely economic gains. For instance, social and sustainability benefits may

also motivate property owners to continue operating these rentals. Nevertheless, in an assessment of Airbnb hosts, it was found that the annual expected profit is approximately \$20,000, but “‘hands-off’ Airbnb hosts can expect occupancy rates (and revenue) at least 15% lower” than more involved hosts (Wallace, 2016).

Impacts to Businesses within the Accommodation Sector: Despite localized economic benefits, the STR industry can disrupt formal industries in the accommodation sector by attracting visitors away from conventional lodging and accommodation companies (Guttentag 2013, Fang 2015). This disruption becomes exacerbated in that many STRs marketed through web-based platforms are often illegal (e.g. being operated without a license/permit, without paying proper taxes/fees, or without having proper inspections). This gives traditional, regulated lodging businesses an economic disadvantage (Guttentag 2013). Continued studies evaluating occupancy rates, revenues per available room, rates of use and rental price, estimated non-lodging spending from short-term renters, and estimates on potential revenue earnings for municipalities will assist in the development of knowledge in this area (NUSI 2015).

Impact on Sharing Economy

STRs often operate by property owners leasing their unused space to tourists and visitors. We characterize activities as sharing economy activities when they use a distribution process to balance the availability of resources and needs of consumers (Daunoriene, et al. 2015). The ways in which STRs influence the sharing economy is still open to interpretation however. I speculate that growth of STRs offered through web-based platforms indicates that there is at least additional capacity in existing housing stock and that these property owners are willing to share their excess space in exchange for monetary compensation (Ellen 2015). Outside of this reality, debate about whether home sharing, through web-based platforms, negatively or positively influences the sharing economy finds a range of perspectives.

In theoretical debates, policy makers have considered adapting the Airbnb home-sharing model to house lower income individuals as a new form of housing assistance (Ellen 2015). The idea that people are interested in providing access to their space to strangers, initiates the conversation that sharing economy activities can be operated in many capacities (outside of corporate co-options), providing different social and economic benefits therein (Martin 2015). STR hosts can also reap economic benefits by participating in the sharing economy, reinforcing their desire to participate in that economy. Specifically, hosts can distribute their assets to supplement their income which has the added benefit of materializing the collaborative use of resources (Lazarouiu 2014, Daunoriene, et al. 2015). Social impacts are realized from public relations perspectives in which, the incremental shift towards home-sharing “has engendered visions of renewed forms of collective urban life” involving sustainability, symbolic interaction, and communication that empowers trust (Gregory et al. 2016).

Other perspectives debate how STRs and home-sharing through web-based platforms bring detrimental impacts on the sharing economy, or at least diminish its reputation. For instance, intermediary businesses that “provide the infrastructure necessary to sustain the sharing community” (Gregory et al. 2016) often enables, or intensifies, the evasion of local laws and regulations (Interian 2016). These businesses can also displace companies that are regulated, and often, do not hold themselves accountable to the negative externalities their business models can create (Interian 2016).

Summary of Impacts of Short-Term Rentals

There is limited data on the impact that short-term rentals have on governments and local economies, hosts and residents, and accommodation sector businesses. Certainly, however, positive and negative impacts will vary across space and time (particularly in regards to housing supply and affordability). Additionally, STRs have and will likely continue to disrupt traditional, lodging options but likely will not replace these businesses altogether. In general, there are also mixed perceptions about how home sharing will affect the sharing economy at large which has created a dichotomy around the topic (expected to remain until more research can occur).

Short-Term Rental Policy

This section first discusses STR policy frameworks and the impact they can have.

Policy Approaches

Integrating STRs into the formal sector through regulations and enforcement has been cited as an important next step to correct some of the negative impacts of STRs (Guttentag 2013). However, policy makers continue to grapple with the rationales, process, and practices of how to best regulate STRs. In a time of economic recession, many wonder if it is beneficial to regulate the STR market at all—in the chance it inhibits homeowners from making ends meet on their mortgages or housing payments (Gottlieb 2013). In general, however, the literature seems to agree on the fact that STRs should be regulated in some fashion, the extent to which is unclear and controversial (Gottlieb 2013, Goodman 2016, and Hood River County 2016).

There appears to be no best way to regulate the STR market that fits the needs of all communities across space. One report suggested a three-part solution:

1. Launch a standard of safety and accountability (strengthening nuisance laws, ensuring hosts have appropriate insurance, etc.);
2. Move past a yes or no debate on short-term rentals (consider the nuances of individual communities and tailor regulations to those nuances); and
3. Enforce what is on the ground and online (to cut down on opportunities to evade laws) (Goodman 2016). Another report articulated several alternatives: develop public nuisance abatement ordinances, ban short-term rentals outright, enact time restrictions (i.e. allowing short-term rentals for a period of 30 days or less), or enact performance based standards (Gottlieb 2013).

The American Planning Association suggests that jurisdictions require licenses, fees and taxes, and insurance; they also suggest consistency with their land use controls and to determine whether inspections are necessary (Sullivan, 2017). In a guidebook on the equitable regulation of short-term rentals, suggestions include clear definitions, active record keeping, protections for housing (supply and affordability), protections for guests, procedures for oversight, protections for neighborhood preservation, and imposition of taxes (Sustainable Economies Law Center 2016). Others argue that STRs, as part of the sharing economy, need special or “innovative” regulatory treatments “precisely because the business model is so new” (Katz 2015).

Transient Lodging Tax

Transient lodging taxes (TLT) are a local option tax levied on lodging facilities (hotels, motels, bed and breakfasts, etc.). While all jurisdictions do not levy a tax of this kind, “taxing tourism is an appealing option for governments facing budgetary constraints and pressures to decrease reliance on a variety of taxes” (Gooroochurn and Sinclair 2005). For instance, taxes levied to hotels offset burden onto tourists, which is especially advantageous in areas with “superior or unique natural resources” as to “capture the ‘rent’ of these resources through taxation” (Oakland and Testa n.d.).

TLTs, and other tourism taxes, are further considered efficient relative to taxing other sectors (Gooroochurn and Sinclair 2005). TLTs are useful to discourage certain businesses, curb negative impacts of certain businesses, or improve fairness (recover service costs from those who benefit from those services) (Oakland and Testa n.d.).

Policy Impacts

Pros and cons exist for all routes and systems of regulation. Overarchingly, we are not fully aware of the impacts alternate policies will have on residents, the local economy, or housing in the long-term. In jurisdictions where STR policies are already established, we still lack a complete awareness on the affect short-term rentals have on residents (Hood River County 2016). Accordingly, because the regulation of STR could affects community members differently, developing policies becomes a challenge and a discussion of equitability. Thus, communities “should arrive at an appropriate and equitable policy through open dialogue with the diversity of stakeholders involved” (Sustainable Economies Law Center 2016).


Summary of Impacts of Policy and Regulation

The establishment of policies for STRs in communities across the country is relatively new. Policies imposed can and likely will disproportionately affect residents. Thus, it is important to establish rules in accordance with best practices and community conversations. As a follow-up to regulations imposed, communities should evaluation the impact their policies have had on residents, neighborhoods, the economy, and housing. Communities should modify policies when deemed necessary.

Summary

Short-term rentals refer to housing units leased or rented for less than 30 days. It is an arrangement that involves the trade of the temporary, but not future use, of a full or partial housing unit (Flath 1980). STRs can provide benefits and/or costs to communities (which will vary across time and space), but appropriate regulations can manage these impacts. The concept map on the following page visually displays the connection between STR subtopics.

Concept Map



Appendix B: Case Studies

This appendix conveys key findings on 10 Oregon cities, selected as case studies (see Table C.1). Case studies are used to delve into the details of STRS in smaller cities (cities with <100,000 people).

Table B.1. Selected Case Studies with Descriptors, 2015


Case Studies	Total Population	City Size Class	City Size Class Legend	Region	Coastal City
Manzanita	426	1	Less than 1,000	North Coast	Yes
Joseph	1,053	2	1,000 to 5,000	Northeast Oregon	No
Rockaway Beach	1,227	2	1,000 to 5,000	North Coast	Yes
Depoe Bay	1,877	2	1,000 to 5,000	North Coast	Yes
Sisters	2,596	2	1,000 to 5,000	Central Oregon	No
Seaside	6,483	3	5,001 to 20,000	North Coast	Yes
Hood River	7,412	3	5,001 to 20,000	Central Oregon	No
Lincoln City	8,386	3	5,001 to 20,000	North Coast	Yes
Ashland	29,556	4	20,001 to 50,000	Southern Oregon	No
Bend	81,780	5	50,001 to 100,000	Central Oregon	No
Total	140,796	-	-	-	-

Source: Population was derived from the American Community Survey, 5-year estimates 2011-2015.

Case studies were chosen as they possess 1) higher levels of Airbnbs (total number) as compared to other Oregon cities and/or 2) they possess a high percentage of Airbnbs as compared to the community's total housing units. All case studies rank within the top 25 cities in either of those two categories; most case studies (except Ashland and Joseph) rank within the top 25 cities of both categories.

The case studies chosen represent 49% of the Airbnbs in cities under 100,000 and 22% of the Airbnbs in all Oregon cities. These 10 cities generate approximately \$54.8 million annually which is 66% of all revenue generated from Airbnbs in cities under 100,000 and 35% of the revenue generated from Airbnbs in all Oregon cities.

Map B.2. Number of Airbnb's by City using Proportional Symbols



Source: AirDnA. Property Data, Retrieved 2017. Oregon Spatial Data. *This map excludes cities with populations greater than 100,000 (Portland, Eugene, Salem, and Gresham). Cities are only showcased in this map that have at least one Airbnb short-term rental.*

Summary Facts

Our case study cities are highly influenced by STRs.


Table B.3. Quick Facts, 2011-2015 Estimates

Case Studies	Population (2015)	Total Housing Units (2015)	Median Household Income (2015)	AirBnBs as % of Total Housing
Ashland	20,556	10,372	\$ 45,704	3%
Bend	81,780	36,579	\$ 52,989	6%
Depoe Bay	1,877	1,469	\$ 46,853	8%
Hood River	7,412	3,504	\$ 47,310	9%
Joseph	1,053	595	\$ 37,216	10%
Lincoln City	8,386	6,439	\$ 37,894	5%
Manzanita	426	1,263	\$ 51,429	7%
Rockaway Beach	1,227	2,105	\$ 37,227	5%
Seaside	6,483	4,602	\$ 37,887	10%
Sisters	2,596	1,331	\$ 50,324	8%

Source: American Community Survey, 2011-2015. AirDnA Property Data, 2017.

Newly created STRs in our case study cities continues to grow. Future, longitudinal studies will help to understand how recent policies effect the amount of STRs entering the market in these communities.

Figure B.4. Percent Change of Newly Created Short-Term Rentals, 2014 to 2016



Source: AirDnA Property Data, Retrieved 2017.

In the following case study cities, STR growth is increasing at a faster rate than total housing units are. In some of these communities, household formation is also increasing at a faster rate than the construction of new housing units, indicating housing supply constraints (Bend, Depoe Bay, Joseph, and Manzanita).

Table B.5. Indication of Possible Housing Supply Constraints

Cities in Oregon	Household Formations			Vacation/Seasonal/ Occasional Use Housing Vacancy			Housing Units			Short-Term Rentals		
	2010	2015	Change	2010	2015	Change	2010	2015	Change	2014	2015	Change
Ashland	9,339	9,446	1%	291	317	9%	10,230	10,372	1%	76	127	67%
Bend	31,596	33,396	6%	1,224	1,414	16%	35,610	36,579	3%	434	1,066	146%
Depoe Bay	618	870	41%	431	446	3%	1,125	1,469	31%	22	66	200%
Hood River	2,764	3,005	9%	247	313	27%	3,214	3,504	9%	127	232	83%
Joseph	435	533	23%	70	40	-43%	556	595	7%	6	45	650%
Lincoln City	3,831	3,876	1%	1,432	2,138	49%	5,731	6,439	12%	125	191	53%
Manzanita	207	200	-3%	1,062	993	-6%	1,320	1,263	-4%	15	36	140%
Rockaway Beach	670	565	-16%	1,026	1,387	35%	1,750	2,105	20%	39	65	67%
Seaside	2,839	2,897	2%	1,221	920	-25%	4,428	4,602	4%	134	255	90%
Sisters	765	949	24%	46	187	307%	956	1,331	39%	17	48	182%
Total	53,064	55,737	5%	9,060	10,170	12%	64,920	68,259	5%	995	2,131	114%

Source: AirDnA Property Data. Retrieved 2017. U.S. Census, American Community Survey, 2010 and 2015.

The following table shows that in some situations, property owners can generate more annual revenue off STRs than they could off standard long-term rental units. This suggests that in resort communities, there may be more of a motive for property owners to operate STRs.

Table B.6. Indication of Competition between Short and Long-Term Housing

Cities in Oregon	Average Annual Revenue (STRs)	Max of Annual Revenue (STRs)	Average Annualized Rent (ACS)	Average Annualized Mortgage (ACS)
Ashland	\$8,309	\$59,876	\$12,456	\$20,208
Bend	\$14,801	\$157,773	\$12,972	\$18,648
Depoe Bay	\$13,866	\$59,288	\$12,264	\$18,636
Hood River	\$7,537	\$81,215	\$13,488	\$20,016
Joseph	\$17,176	\$64,836	\$7,980	\$14,232
Lincoln City	\$12,265	\$117,250	\$10,080	\$18,804
Manzanita	\$16,105	\$90,051	\$10,548	\$24,432
Rockaway Beach	\$15,925	\$98,481	\$8,316	\$14,556
Seaside	\$16,285	\$198,425	\$10,704	\$19,356
Sisters	\$9,196	\$48,000	\$12,312	\$19,068
Total	\$13,662	\$198,425	\$11,112	\$18,796

Source: AirDnA Property Data, Retrieved 2017. U.S. Census, American Community Survey, 2010 and 2015.

Table B.7. Airbnbs Organized by Listing Type and Days Reserved

	Entire home/apt	Private room	Shared room	Total
Ashland	180	79	1	260
Less than 30 Days	34%	21%	0.4%	55%
30 to 90 Days	13%	4%	-	17%
91 to 180 Days	17%	5%	-	22%
181 Days or More	6%	1%	-	7%
Bend	1,765	407	4	2,176
Less than 30 Days	35%	9%	0.1%	45%
30 to 90 Days	29%	5%	0.0%	34%
91 to 180 Days	13%	3%	0.0%	16%
181 Days or More	4%	2%	-	6%
Depoe Bay	113	6	-	119
Less than 30 Days	48%	4%	-	52%
30 to 90 Days	24%	-	-	24%
91 to 180 Days	20%	1%	-	21%
181 Days or More	3%	-	-	3%
Hood River	211	99	12	322
Less than 30 Days	32%	17%	4%	52%
30 to 90 Days	19%	6%	-	25%
91 to 180 Days	11%	7%	-	17%
181 Days or More	4%	1%	-	5%
Joseph	51	6	1	58
Less than 30 Days	17%	3%	-	21%
30 to 90 Days	34%	3%	-	38%
91 to 180 Days	29%	3%	2%	34%
181 Days or More	7%	-	-	7%
Lincoln City	319	19	-	338
Less than 30 Days	49%	2%	-	51%
30 to 90 Days	26%	1%	-	27%
91 to 180 Days	17%	2%	-	19%
181 Days or More	2%	1%	-	3%
Manzanita	77	8	-	85
Less than 30 Days	38%	5%	-	42%
30 to 90 Days	29%	5%	-	34%
91 to 180 Days	20%	-	-	20%
181 Days or More	4%	-	-	4%
Rockaway Beach	99	6	1	106
Less than 30 Days	34%	2%	1%	37%
30 to 90 Days	24%	1%	-	25%
91 to 180 Days	28%	2%	-	30%
181 Days or More	8%	1%	-	8%
Seaside	393	46	3	442
Less than 30 Days	40%	6%	-	46%
30 to 90 Days	26%	3%	0.2%	29%
91 to 180 Days	16%	1%	0.5%	18%
181 Days or More	7%	0%	-	7%
Sisters	78	29	-	107
Less than 30 Days	33%	15%	-	48%
30 to 90 Days	23%	8%	-	32%
91 to 180 Days	15%	3%	-	18%
181 Days or More	2%	1%	-	3%
Total	3,286	705	22	4,013

Legislative Approaches

Table c.4. Case Study City Legislative Approaches

Case Study	Defined	Adopted	Requirements & Standards	Indication of Effectiveness	Ordinance Link
Ashland	Travelers' Accommodations (TA) or Accessory Travelers' Accommodations (ATA), for one or more occasions for a period less than 30 consecutive days	2015	<p><u>TA and ATA Requirements:</u> Conditional Use Permit; Subject to Site Design Review; Subject to inspection by fire department and Jackson County Health Department; City business license; Register for and pay transient occupancy tax</p> <p><u>TA Standards:</u> Located within 200 feet of boulevard, avenue, or neighborhood collector; Property must be primary residence of the business-owner or person entered into a lease agreement with the property owner permitting use of property for the accommodation; Primary resident on site must be 20 years old; Minimum lot and GSF standards; Parking standard (one off-street parking space per accommodation and business-owner's unit must have two parking spaces)</p> <p><u>ATA Standards:</u> Limit to one accommodation unit per property (no more than two bedrooms with two people per room); No signs; Property must have two off-street parking spaces; Guest vehicles must not exceed one; Meals and kitchen cooking facilities are not permitted</p>	Somewhat Effective	http://www.ashland.or.us/SIB/files/AMC_Chpt_18_current.pdf (Section 18.2.3.220)
Bend	Use of a dwelling unit by any person or group of persons entitled to occupy for rent for a period of less than 30 consecutive days	2006, Updated 2015	Short term rental permit, Subject to review dependent on location and days available; Annual operation license; Concentration limits (250 feet between properties); Less than 30 days and owner-occupied allows exemption from concentration limits; Occupancy limited to two persons per bedroom plus two additional people; One parking space per bedroom; Subject to inspection	Very Effective to Somewhat Effective	http://www.codepublishing.com/OR/Bend/Section 3.6.500
Depoe Bay	Less than 30 successive calendar days	-	Prohibited except as permitted under the zoning code; 8% Transient Room Tax, City business license; Registration; Four year amortized period	-	http://www.cityofdepobay.org/pdf/ordinances/zoning24codifiedNov2011.pdf (Section 4.650)

Case Study	Defined	Adopted	Requirements & Standards	Indication of Effectiveness	Ordinance Link
Hood River	Transient Rental: a dwelling unit or room(s) rented for compensation on less than a month-to-month basis	2016	3% transient room tax; Short-term rental operating license; Maximum occupancy two persons per bedroom plus two additional persons; One off-street parking space for every two bedrooms; Dwelling must be primary residence of the property owner	Too Soon to Tell	http://ci.hood-river.or.us/pageview.aspx?id=20524 (Section 17.04.115)
Joseph	Travelers accomodation: any primary residence, which is not a hotel or motel, having rooms, apartments or sleeping facilities rented or kept for rent on a daily or weekly basis to travelers or transients for a fee; Occupancy for less than 30 days	2016	3% transient lodging tax; Licence and/or permit; Facility is subject to review during first three years of operation after which time a permanent permit for the facility as accredited travelers' accomodation will be issued; One off-street parking space with owner's unit having two spaces; One sign of six sf maximum with no more than 150 watts of illumination; Annual inspection by the County Health Department	Somewhat Ineffective	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6NISJlJv4gad3NoR3BHTjIZODg/edit
Lincoln City	Vacation rental dwelling: a dwelling unit that is used, rented or occupied on a daily or weekly basis, or is available for use, rent, or occupancy on a daily or weekly basis, or is advertised, or listed by an agent, as available for use, rent, or occupancy on a daily or weekly basis.	Initially in 1996, updated 2016	\$350 land use approval application fee, plus \$100 license fee, plus \$150 occupational tax permit; Transient lodging tax at 9.5% of rental charge	Somewhat Effective	http://www.codepublishing.com/OR/LincolnCity/(section.17.80.050.and.at.Chapter.5.1).amendments.are.found.at http://www.lincolncity.org/index.asp?SEC=55A859F7-5E25-4659-B7BE-B0445F128F08&Type=B_BASICin Ordinances 2016-14, 2016-20, and 2016-26
Manzanita	Short Term Rental: A dwelling unit that is rented for a period not to exceed 29 days.	1994; current policies adopted 2010, amended 2016	\$250 permit (annual), 9% transient room tax; Advertisement must contain licensing number; Subject to inspection and periodic reinspection; Some areas subject to cap; Off-street parking for two vehicles; Signage no larger than 90 square inches; Occupancy capacity of two persons per sleeping room plus an additional four persons	Somewhat Ineffective	http://www.ci.manzanita.or.us/_docs/ordinances/STR/Ordinance%2010%2003%20STR%20regulations%20amend%2016%2005%20120716.pdf

Case Study	Defined	Adopted	Requirements & Standards	Indication of Effectiveness	Ordinance Link
Rockaway Beach	Under 30 nights stay	Prior to 2003	Business license; 9% transient room tax	Somewhat Effective	http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Oregon/rockawaybeach_or/thecityofrockawaybeachoregoncodeofordina?f=templates\$fn=default.htm\$3.0\$vid=amlegal:rockawaybeach_or
Seaside	Less than 30 day		Conditional Use Permit subject to public hearing; Subject to inspection; Transient room tax provisions; Permit will be reviewed if two complaints are received by different residencies claiming adverse impact; Minimum of two off street parking spaces plus one additional for each bedroom over two	-	http://www.cityofseaside.us/sites/default/files/vrd_checklist2016.pdf ; http://www.cityofseaside.us/sites/default/files/vrd_checklist2016.pdf
Sisters	Vacation rental: The use of a residential dwelling unit by any person or group of persons entitled to occupy for rent for a period of less than 30 consecutive days per month and that is rented in such a manner for more than 10 days in a calendar year	2010	Business license, Transient room tax, Subject to inspection, Complaints can revoke permit, Subject to type 1 review process	Somewhat Effective	http://sistersoregon.gelfuzion.net/pdf/development-code/Chapter%202.15%20Special%20Provisions%2011.23.14.pdf

Source: Responding to Short-Term Rentals Survey, 2017 and code review (see links in table).

Appendix C: Industry Summary for Cities with Airbnbs

The following table provides industry data for all cities in Oregon with Airbnb.

Table D.1. Industry Summary by Region

City by Region	AirBnBs as % of Total Housing	Avg. Daily Rate per Property	% of Properties Reserved >30 Days	% of Properties (Entire Home)	% of Properties (Private/Shared Room)	Annual Revenue
Central Oregon	4%	\$209	53%	78%	22%	\$37,539,776
Bend	6%	\$238	55%	81%	19%	\$32,207,439
Cascade Locks	1%	\$75	57%	57%	43%	\$20,557
Culver	0%	\$0	0%	100%	0%	\$0
Dufur	1%	\$150	75%	50%	50%	\$19,189
Hood River	9%	\$129	47%	66%	34%	\$2,426,970
La Pine	3%	\$95	65%	81%	19%	\$214,018
Madras	0%	\$49	0%	73%	27%	\$4,635
Maupin	1%	\$216	100%	100%	0%	\$57,672
Mosier	12%	\$100	42%	81%	19%	\$200,261
Prineville	1%	\$93	54%	50%	50%	\$171,475
Redmond	1%	\$115	49%	74%	26%	\$1,036,179
Sisters	8%	\$153	51%	73%	27%	\$983,947
The Dalles	0%	\$108	53%	43%	57%	\$197,434
North Coastal Oregon	5%	\$206	53%	86%	14%	\$24,875,499
Astoria	2%	\$101	61%	52%	48%	\$890,097
Bay City	2%	\$133	57%	93%	7%	\$111,417
Cannon Beach	4%	\$322	71%	95%	5%	\$2,876,320
Depoe Bay	8%	\$207	47%	95%	5%	\$1,650,062
Garibaldi	0%	\$199	0%	100%	0%	\$4,575
Lincoln City	5%	\$237	48%	94%	6%	\$4,145,729
Manzanita	7%	\$271	56%	91%	9%	\$1,368,957
Nehalem	46%	\$168	58%	60%	40%	\$879,648
Newport	2%	\$185	46%	79%	21%	\$1,322,513
Rockaway Beach	5%	\$192	63%	93%	7%	\$1,688,036
Seaside	10%	\$216	49%	89%	11%	\$7,198,080
Tillamook	4%	\$156	55%	89%	11%	\$1,014,970
Toledo	0%	\$25	50%	0%	100%	\$6,134
Waldport	4%	\$145	57%	76%	24%	\$435,804
Warrenton	1%	\$168	55%	95%	5%	\$282,578
Wheeler	0%	\$0	0%	100%	0%	\$0
Yachats	8%	\$158	78%	78%	22%	\$1,000,579
Northeast Oregon	1%	\$129	45%	64%	36%	\$1,738,663
Baker City	0%	\$115	55%	60%	40%	\$158,813
Condon	1%	\$89	0%	50%	50%	\$1,091
Elgin	1%	\$86	43%	43%	57%	\$22,840
Enterprise	3%	\$127	48%	52%	48%	\$217,418
Fossil	4%	\$134	30%	30%	70%	\$24,072
Grass Valley	3%	\$127	50%	100%	0%	\$7,355
Haines	0%	\$85	0%	0%	100%	\$1,615
Halfway	2%	\$75	25%	75%	25%	\$8,595

City by Region	AirBnBs as % of Total Housing	Avg. Daily Rate per Property	% of Properties Reserved >30 Days	% of Properties (Entire Home)	% of Properties (Private/Shared Room)	Annual Revenue
Northeast Oregon Continued...						
Heppner	0%	\$0	0%	100%	0%	\$0
Hermiston	0%	\$15	0%	75%	25%	\$120
Ione	4%	\$67	0%	50%	50%	\$1,200
Irrigon	0%	\$0	0%	0%	100%	\$0
John Day	1%	\$85	14%	100%	0%	\$13,905
Joseph	10%	\$205	79%	88%	12%	\$996,192
La Grande	0%	\$86	25%	55%	45%	\$44,465
Long Creek	5%	\$86	0%	0%	100%	\$344
Lostine	4%	\$89	60%	100%	0%	\$45,525
Milton Freewater	0%	\$95	20%	60%	40%	\$23,925
Mitchell	6%	\$147	0%	83%	17%	\$11,222
Moro	3%	\$76	0%	0%	100%	\$2,490
Pendleton	0%	\$140	27%	67%	33%	\$49,041
Prairie City	1%	\$120	60%	100%	0%	\$31,464
Richland	1%	\$72	100%	100%	0%	\$5,495
Umatilla	0%	\$198	0%	100%	0%	\$792
Union	0%	\$133	0%	100%	0%	\$5,319
Unity	2%	\$105	0%	100%	0%	\$2,200
Wallowa	0%	\$48	50%	50%	50%	\$9,690
Wasco	4%	\$91	88%	13%	88%	\$53,475
Portland Metro	2%	\$82	48%	57%	43%	\$69,880,529
Beaverton	1%	\$61	49%	37%	63%	\$1,620,761
Cornelius	0%	\$146	100%	50%	50%	\$15,402
Damascus	0%	\$48	44%	33%	67%	\$35,011
Fairview	0%	\$75	61%	61%	39%	\$86,018
Forest Grove	0%	\$65	42%	33%	67%	\$90,651
Gladstone	0%	\$62	33%	56%	44%	\$30,761
Gresham	0%	\$78	35%	39%	61%	\$196,700
Happy Valley	1%	\$79	26%	46%	54%	\$197,404
Hillsboro	1%	\$75	37%	37%	63%	\$757,834
Lake Oswego	1%	\$98	41%	55%	45%	\$993,534
Oregon City	1%	\$57	36%	38%	62%	\$373,295
Portland	3%	\$83	49%	60%	40%	\$64,746,132
Sherwood	0%	\$104	48%	52%	48%	\$197,885
Troutdale	0%	\$50	33%	43%	57%	\$71,959
West Linn	1%	\$71	38%	45%	55%	\$383,343
Wilsonville	0%	\$49	28%	24%	76%	\$83,839
South Coastal Oregon	1%	\$132	52%	75%	25%	\$2,335,541
Bandon	2%	\$227	52%	63%	38%	\$423,053
Brookings	2%	\$124	40%	65%	35%	\$447,365

City by Region	AirBnBs as % of Total Housing	Avg. Daily Rate per Property	% of Properties Reserved >30 Days	% of Properties (Entire Home)	% of Properties (Private/Shared Room)	Annual Revenue
South Coastal Oregon Continued...						
Coos Bay	1%	\$109	74%	74%	26%	\$393,664
Coquille	0%	\$67	67%	0%	100%	\$9,600
Florence	1%	\$103	58%	80%	20%	\$342,405
Gold Beach	3%	\$136	51%	88%	12%	\$310,273
Lakeside	0%	\$58	33%	100%	0%	\$12,625
North Bend	0%	\$93	72%	89%	11%	\$122,735
Port Orford	4%	\$137	32%	97%	3%	\$208,399
Reedsport	1%	\$73	35%	53%	47%	\$65,422
Southeast Oregon	1%	\$125	48%	79%	21%	\$1,143,628
Burns	1%	\$42	30%	40%	60%	\$60,935
Chiloquin	1%	\$130	74%	89%	11%	\$185,222
Jordan Valley	1%	\$2	50%	50%	50%	\$161
Klamath Falls	1%	\$135	46%	82%	18%	\$880,611
Ontario	0%	\$53	50%	50%	50%	\$7,709
Paisley	1%	\$145	100%	100%	0%	\$8,990
Southern Oregon	1%	\$98	47%	57%	43%	\$4,886,800
Ashland	3%	\$119	45%	69%	31%	\$2,160,243
Canyonville	0%	\$180	0%	20%	80%	\$1,052
Cave Junction	2%	\$69	50%	36%	64%	\$57,470
Central Point	0%	\$91	63%	43%	57%	\$180,830
Eagle Point	0%	\$98	50%	40%	60%	\$49,303
Elkton	3%	\$44	33%	100%	0%	\$26,213
Gold Hill	1%	\$141	63%	100%	0%	\$57,729
Grants Pass	1%	\$76	41%	52%	48%	\$449,096
Jacksonville	4%	\$97	45%	52%	48%	\$318,241
Medford	0%	\$85	53%	59%	41%	\$728,615
Myrtle Creek	1%	\$55	25%	63%	38%	\$15,248
Myrtle Point	0%	\$63	100%	0%	100%	\$25,257
Oakland	1%	\$123	50%	25%	75%	\$41,461
Phoenix	1%	\$59	33%	33%	67%	\$50,563
Riddle	0%	\$0	0%	100%	0%	\$0
Rogue River	0%	\$122	100%	100%	0%	\$33,902
Roseburg	0%	\$88	37%	44%	56%	\$180,605
Sandy	0%	\$182	85%	77%	23%	\$140,041
Shady Cove	0%	\$179	0%	100%	0%	\$4,015
Talent	3%	\$69	53%	39%	61%	\$366,916
Winston	0%	\$0	0%	100%	0%	\$0
Yoncalla	0%	\$0	0%	100%	0%	\$0
Willamette Valley	1%	\$109	45%	53%	47%	\$14,333,540
Albany	0%	\$42	50%	33%	67%	\$142,465

City by Region	AirBnBs as % of Total Housing	Avg. Daily Rate per Property	% of Properties Reserved >30 Days	% of Properties (Entire Home)	% of Properties (Private/Shared Room)	Annual Revenue
Willamette Valley Continued...						
Amity	1%	\$147	86%	86%	14%	\$98,095
Aumsville	0%	\$80	0%	100%	0%	\$80
Aurora	2%	\$99	71%	71%	29%	\$63,928
Banks	1%	\$114	43%	29%	71%	\$43,118
Brownsville	1%	\$107	80%	70%	30%	\$59,008
Canby	0%	\$50	52%	24%	76%	\$67,515
Carlton	3%	\$158	28%	83%	17%	\$155,952
Clatskanie	0%	\$53	33%	33%	67%	\$12,001
Columbia City	0%	\$0	0%	50%	50%	\$0
Corvallis	1%	\$78	46%	32%	68%	\$994,099
Cottage Grove	1%	\$40	26%	43%	57%	\$81,810
Creswell	1%	\$68	55%	55%	45%	\$36,876
Dallas	0%	\$78	40%	60%	40%	\$26,238
Dayton	4%	\$138	45%	79%	21%	\$199,324
Detroit	0%	\$187	0%	100%	0%	\$5,050
Dundee	3%	\$216	57%	67%	33%	\$341,089
Estacada	0%	\$32	50%	50%	50%	\$11,879
Eugene	2%	\$124	43%	59%	41%	\$8,284,555
Falls City	0%	\$0	0%	100%	0%	\$0
Gaston	5%	\$126	55%	82%	18%	\$112,446
Gates	2%	\$113	25%	100%	0%	\$18,485
Harrisburg	0%	\$180	0%	100%	0%	\$6,030
Hubbard	0%	\$51	0%	0%	100%	\$760
Idanha	4%	\$219	40%	40%	60%	\$32,812
Independence	1%	\$82	41%	59%	41%	\$71,170
Jefferson	0%	\$46	40%	60%	40%	\$11,738
Junction City	1%	\$97	50%	56%	44%	\$68,555
Lafayette	0%	\$0	0%	100%	0%	\$0
Lebanon	0%	\$51	50%	50%	50%	\$15,787
Lowell	1%	\$153	67%	100%	0%	\$49,060
Lyons	1%	\$115	67%	50%	50%	\$67,071
Mcminnville	1%	\$133	62%	58%	42%	\$647,527
Mill City	0%	\$118	50%	0%	100%	\$2,490
Molalla	0%	\$68	0%	40%	60%	\$5,161
Monmouth	0%	\$54	29%	29%	71%	\$33,461
Monroe	1%	\$112	50%	0%	100%	\$8,536
Newberg	1%	\$151	47%	64%	36%	\$594,929
North Plains	0%	\$35	0%	50%	50%	\$1,341
Oakridge	0%	\$46	22%	78%	22%	\$24,837
Philomath	1%	\$71	53%	67%	33%	\$78,164

City by Region	AirBnBs as % of Total Housing	Avg. Daily Rate per Property	% of Properties Reserved >30 Days	% of Properties (Entire Home)	% of Properties (Private/Shared Room)	Annual Revenue
Willamette Valley Continued...						
Rainier	0%	\$0	0%	50%	50%	\$0
Saint Helens	0%	\$45	25%	25%	75%	\$12,493
Saint Paul	1%	\$0	0%	100%	0%	\$0
Salem	0%	\$60	46%	32%	68%	\$733,510
Scappoose	0%	\$53	50%	25%	75%	\$55,434
Scio	2%	\$93	67%	50%	50%	\$55,987
Scotts Mills	2%	\$157	67%	100%	0%	\$19,789
Sheridan	1%	\$101	50%	60%	40%	\$38,935
Silverton	1%	\$98	59%	41%	59%	\$179,167
Springfield	0%	\$98	45%	46%	54%	\$454,422
Stayton	0%	\$85	67%	67%	33%	\$50,039
Sublimity	0%	\$77	67%	0%	100%	\$10,425
Sweet Home	0%	\$24	0%	67%	33%	\$648
Tangent	0%	\$124	100%	100%	0%	\$4,451
Turner	0%	\$49	50%	50%	50%	\$1,472
Veneta	1%	\$92	20%	45%	55%	\$54,950
Vernonia	1%	\$79	29%	14%	86%	\$15,236
Westfir	8%	\$96	33%	50%	50%	\$74,176
Willamina	0%	\$108	100%	100%	0%	\$14,133
Woodburn	0%	\$61	56%	11%	89%	\$21,562
Yamhill	3%	\$104	42%	58%	42%	\$63,269
Total	2%	\$120	49%	63%	37%	\$156,733,976

Source: AirDnA. Property Data. *Airbnbs as % of total housing units* uses American Community Survey data (2011-2015).

Appendix D: Sensitivity Test, AirDnA vs Airbnb Data

Sensitivity testing suggests similarities between both datasets. Note, Airbnb data was pulled in January of 2017, while AirDnA data was pulled in March of 2017. This may have created slight discrepancies for indicators. Still, proportion of entire homes and private/shared rooms are within +/- 3% on average. Host incomes were within +/- \$5,000 (removing Cannon Beach as the outlier). Average nights hosted/reserved days were within +68/-42 days and the average difference between monthly rates was \$72.

Table E.1. Sensitivity Testing of AirDnA and Airbnb Data using Various Indicators

City	Proportion of Entire Home Listings		Proportion of Private/Shared Room Listings		Typical Host Income		Typical Nights Hosted/Reservation Days		Average Nightly Rate	
	AirBnB	AirDnA	AirBnB	AirDnA	AirBnB (Groomed)	AirDnA	AirBnB (Groomed)	AirDnA	AirBnb (2016)	AirDnA
Ashland	77%	69%	23%	31%	\$10,550	\$8,309	71	53	\$131	\$189
Astoria	55%	52%	45%	48%	\$8,080	\$9,176	67	75	\$132	\$136
Bandon	67%	63%	33%	38%	-	\$8,814	-	-	\$162	\$294
Beaverton	44%	37%	56%	63%	\$6,290	\$4,739	94	52	\$92	\$120
Bend	75%	81%	25%	19%	\$10,280	\$14,801	46	56	\$154	\$354
Brookings	78%	65%	22%	35%	-	\$7,849	-	49	\$145	\$197
Cannon Beach	97%	95%	3%	5%	\$9,930	\$35,077	28	96	\$255	\$426
Corvallis	43%	32%	57%	68%	\$5,760	\$5,178	40	50	\$98	\$109
Cottage Grove	42%	43%	58%	57%	-	\$2,337	-	32	\$67	\$85
Depoe Bay	99%	95%	1%	5%	-	\$13,866	-	50	\$311	\$347
Florence	81%	80%	19%	20%	-	\$8,560	-	69	\$119	\$153
Gearhart	97%	-	3%	-	-	-	-	-	\$294	-
Gold Beach	90%	88%	10%	12%	-	\$7,216	-	42	\$183	\$290
Grants Pass	68%	52%	32%	48%	\$7,560	\$4,491	69	38	\$111	\$141
Hillsboro	41%	37%	59%	63%	\$5,240	\$3,609	49	35	\$80	\$115
Hood River	66%	66%	34%	34%	\$7,400	\$7,537	36	50	\$150	\$186
Jacksonville	58%	52%	42%	48%	\$6,170	\$4,750	45	39	\$118	\$141
Jordan Valley	68%	50%	32%	50%	-	\$81	12	17	-	\$75

City	Proportion of Entire Home Listings		Proportion of Private/Shared Room Listings		Typical Host Income		Typical Nights Hosted/Reservation Days		Average Nightly Rate	
	AirBnB	AirDnA	AirBnB	AirDnA	AirBnB (Groomed)	AirDnA	AirBnB (Groomed)	AirDnA	AirBnB (2016)	AirDnA
Joseph	87%	88%	13%	12%	-	\$17,176	-	78	\$181	\$240
Klamath Falls	85%	82%	15%	18%	\$3,220	\$6,572	21	43	\$142	\$178
La Pine	83%	81%	17%	19%	-	\$6,904	-	59	\$139	\$438
Lake Oswego	63%	55%	37%	45%	\$8,930	\$6,759	57	42	\$136	\$211
Lincoln City	94%	94%	6%	6%	\$14,170	\$12,265	32	51	\$182	\$386
Manzanita	95%	91%	5%	9%	\$16,160	\$16,105	57	60	\$269	\$362
McMinnville	55%	58%	45%	42%	\$8,850	\$8,750	58	61	\$149	\$190
Medford	63%	59%	37%	41%	\$10,410	\$6,809	60	65	\$109	\$159
Milwaukie	49%	-	51%	-	\$9,790	-	170	-	\$71	-
Nehalem	45%	60%	55%	40%	-	\$12,217	-	76	\$153	\$214
Newberg	62%	64%	38%	36%	\$4,980	\$7,345	59	44	\$152	\$234
Newport	82%	79%	18%	21%	\$10,730	\$9,380	60	47	\$167	\$343
Oregon City	53%	38%	47%	62%	-	\$4,912	-	48	\$87	\$104
Redmond	76%	74%	24%	26%	\$9,090	\$6,642	49	50	\$107	\$171
Rockaway Beach	94%	93%	6%	7%	\$18,800	\$15,925	94	76	\$225	\$314
Seaside	85%	89%	15%	11%	\$11,170	\$16,285	24	56	\$203	\$309
Sisters	71%	73%	29%	27%	\$8,010	\$9,196	58	47	\$185	\$246
Springfield	51%	46%	49%	54%	\$3,720	\$4,057	61	44	\$79	\$137
Talent	34%	39%	66%	61%	\$5,850	\$4,892	100	64	\$77	\$98
The Dalles	41%	43%	59%	57%	-	\$6,581	-	63	\$108	\$146
Tigard	35%	-	65%	-	\$3,140	-	55	-	\$91	-
Tillamook	92%	89%	8%	11%	-	\$11,941	-	64	\$189	\$243
Waldport	83%	76%	17%	24%	\$15,290	\$9,474	51	55	\$189	\$258
West Linn	50%	45%	50%	55%	\$4,670	\$4,675	62	42	\$106	\$115
Yachats	76%	78%	24%	22%	\$13,520	\$14,714	122	115	\$130	\$200

Source: AirDnA, Property Data, Retrieved March 2017. Airbnb Property Data, as of January 1, 2017.

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